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INTRODUCTION

In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA or the Act)' to prohibit discrimination on
account of age. Although the Act was originally limited to private employment, it was subsequently extended to the state and
federal sectors. 2 Unlike other employment discrimination legislation, however, the ADEA does not flatly prohibit discrimination
on the basis of the specified characteristic. Rather, the original
act defined "age" as 40-65,' thus only barring age discrimination
against older workers and, even then, permitting the traditional
mandatory retirement at age 65.'
Two subsequent amendments extended the upper age limit.
In the 1978 amendments to the statute, the 65 age limit was expanded to 70 for nonfederal employees and removed entirely in
covered federal employment.5 In 1986, the Act was again
amended, this time to remove the upper age limit for almost all
covered employees. 6 Although certain transitional provisions
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1985). Subsequent references will be both by U.S.C.
section and by section of the act.
2 Id. at § 630(b). See also Pub. L. No. 93-259, effective May 1, 1974.
3 29 U.S.C. § 631, § 12 (1985).
4 The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-135 (as amended by Pub.
L. No. 95-65) (effective January 1, 1979) was broader in this respect, barring "unreasonable discrimination on the basis of age in programs or activities receiving
federal financial assistance ..
" § 302. The statute, however, apparently does not
provide for a private civil action by aggrieved parties. See generally Symposium, Age
Discrimination, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805 (1981); U.S. Comm'n. on Civil Rights, The
Age Discrimination Statute (1977).
5 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95256. These basic changes were effective January 1, 1979, for nonfederal employees
and September 30, 1978, for federal employees.
6 Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592.
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limit the impact of these changes for a time, 7 the amendments
invalidate thousands of mandatory retirement policies. As a result, despite a few exceptions,' the ADEA constitutes a sweeping
bar on discrimination against older workers 9 on account of their
age.
A full appreciation of the significance of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act requires an understanding not only of
the core substantive provisions of that law but also its ancillary
prohibitions, including the antiretaliation and no-wage reduction
provisions. Further, the full meaning of the statute depends
upon defining the extent of several important exceptions from its
general proscriptions. Finally, any attorney involved in an ADEA
matter must understand the unique procedural and remedial
frameworks within which any federal age discrimination claim
must be placed. While the authors have undertaken such a comprehensive treatment of the ADEA in the context of their treatise, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION,' ° which analyzes all of the
antidiscrimination statute, this article has a considerably nar7 The transitional provisions for the 1978 amendments have expired. They are
dealt with in more detail in C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAw OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.3 (1980).

The transitional provisions of the 1986 amendments, Act of Oct. 31, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, are as

follows:
1. The general effective date of the Amendments is January 1,
1987. § 7(a).
2. There is a temporary exception for tenured professors that expires on December 31, 1993; until that time such persons may be
mandatorily retired at 70. § 6(b).
3. There is an exception for certain collective bargaining agreements. If such agreements were in effect on June 30, 1986, and terminate after January 1, 1987, the amendments do not apply until the
termination of the agreement or January 1, 1990, whichever occurs first.
§ 7(a).
4. The amendments create a temporary exception permitting age
discrimination against law enforcement officers and firefighters, which is
to expire on December 31, 1993, but guard against retroactive effect of
this exception for cases in which the cause of action arose before January 1, 1987. § 7(b).
8 The broadest exception is the "bona fide occupational qualification" (bfoq)
defense; see infra § VIA. In addition to other specific exceptions treated in that section, the ADEA apparently also leaves intact certain federal statutes establishing
age limitations for federal employment, mainly for law enforcement officers and
firefighters. See Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 427 U.S. 353
(1985); Stewart v. Smith (Civiletti), 673 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
9 It still remains permissible under the ADEA to discriminate against younger
workers (those below 40) on the basis of age. Thomas v. United States Postal Inspection Serv., 647 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1981).
10 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (2d
ed. 1988).

806

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:803

rower focus, surveying the theories of liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and discussing some of the more
important exceptions from its basic prohibition of age discrimination in employment.

II.

THEORIES OF AGE DISCRIMINATION

The substantive provisions of the ADEA parallel the provisions of Title VII with respect to the basic prohibition of age discrimination. 1 Subject to certain important exceptions, 12 it is
unlawful for employers, 13 employment agencies, 14 and labor organizations 5 to discriminate against any individual "because of
such individual's age."' 6 The major limitation on the substantive
reach of the ADEA was originally its restricted definition of age.
As passed in 1967, the statute defined age to include "individuals
who are at least forty years of age but less than sixty-five years of
age."' 17 The statute thus effectively excluded, wholly without regard to any retirement system exception, the most prevalent
form of age discrimination-mandatory retirement at 65.
In two stages Congress effectively removed the upper age
limit.' 8 The statute does, however, continue to restrict its protections to those 40 and older, thus permitting discrimination on
account of age as long as the victims are less than 40. This effectively places protected older workers in a preferred position visa-vis younger ones who may be victimized by age discrimination' 9 without any statutory redress. 20 Nevertheless, those
1 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
12 See infra § VI.
13 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), § 4(a) (1985). Compare the Title VII counterpart, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), § 703(a) (1981). See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION,
supra note 10, at § 1.3.
14 29 U.S.C. § 623(b), § 4(b). Compare the Title VII counterpart, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(b), § 703(b). Seegenerally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at

§ 1.5.

15 29 U.S.C. § 623(c), § 4(c). Compare the Title VII counterpart, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(c), § 703(c) (1981). Seegenerally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION supra note

10, at § 1.6.
16 29 U.S.C. § 623, § 4. The Act specifies the varieties of prohibited employment-related discrimination in the same broad terms as Title VII.
17 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
18 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. This expansion pretermits most
questions of whether the Constitution would bar mandatory retirement where the
requisite state action is involved in the employment relation. The Supreme Court
had generally upheld mandatory retirement under equal protection analysis.
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976).
19 While such discriminations are not commonplace, they occasionally exist, as
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younger than 40 may sometimes be incidental beneficiaries of the
Act. For example, an employer that wishes a "youth image"
would scarcely be well-advised to adopt a policy limiting employment to those "under 25" and "40 and over." While such a policy would be legal despite the discrimination against those
between 25 and 40, it would tend to increase the average age of
its workers. Further, because of the "no wage reduction"
clause, 2 ' a younger worker may be able to bring an ADEA action
alleging a violation of this provision.
One other implication of the creation of a protected group
40 and older should be noted; since the Act bars age discrimination against all those above age 40, it follows that discrimination
on age grounds between covered individuals is also barred. Thus, an
employer cannot, because of age, favor an applicant age 40 to
one age 69, or vice versa.22 This view is taken by the EEOC's
Interpretive Rules," although those rules recognize an exception
suggesting that greater benefits to older workers within the protected group may be permissible.24 As a consequence, the EEOC
indicated by the debate during the passage of the ADEA about the protection of
airline stewardesses who were frequently compelled to "retire" at 32. See H.R.
Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
20 Whether youth restrictions in the public employment sector could be attacked
on constitutional grounds is not addressed in this work. See supra note 18.
21 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), § 4(a). See also EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note
10, at § 19.7.2.
22 See generally Note, PreferentialHiring Policiesfor Older Workers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 825 (1983).
23 29 C.F.R. § 1625.1 (1986). These Rules supersede those of the Department
of Labor, which was originally assigned enforcement duties for the ADEA. For the
most part, the department's rules, which are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 806.1 (1986)
were revoked on issuance of the EEOC's interpretations. 46 Fed. Reg. 47726
(Sept. 29, 1981). Remaining effective Labor Department regulations are noted.
While the Department of Labor's views were not substantially different from the
EEOC's present rules, particular variances are noted.
24 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1986). While § 2(a) states the general rule that discrimination within the protected age category is prohibited, § 2(b) states an exception:
The extension of additional benefits, such as unearned severance pay, to
older workers within the protected age bracket may be lawful if an employer has a reasonable basis to conclude that those benefits will
counteract problems related to age discrimination. The extension of
additional benefits may not be used as a means to accomplish practices
otherwise prohibited by the Act.
Taken literally, this formulation recognizes only a very narrow exception: while severance pay may "counteract problems related to age discrimination" in searching
for a new job, other benefits, for example, an exemption from compulsory overtime
for older workers, would not seem to be permissible under the interpretations.
The legislative history of the 1978 amendments suggests, however, that "special
jobs, part-time employment, retraining and transfer to less physically demanding
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presumably believes that basic hiring and firing decisions cannot
discriminate between older and younger members of the class,
but that some ancillary benefits can be adjusted to favor older
workers.25

The appropriateness of this exception to the general prohibition of age discrimination within the protected group is questionable. On one level, it might be argued that the obvious
purpose of the ADEA was to combat age discrimination, which
presumably becomes more frequent and harmful as workers get
older. Accordingly, preference for older workers, perhaps even
including hiring and discharge preferences, are consistent with
that view. Such an argument would draw on United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,26 which held that Title VII permitted certain racial preferences favoring blacks despite its apparently plain language barring all discrimination on account of race. The
contrary view is simply that the ADEA prohibits age discrimination against a class of persons, and it would be anomalous to allow some members of that class to be preferred over others.
Under this view, Weber is inapposite because that case did not involve the subordination of the rights of some victims of discrimination to those of other victims of that same kind of
discrimination.27
However important the question of whether older workers
can be favored vis-a-vis younger workers within the protected
group, the primary aim of the ADEA was to deal with the converse situation: discrimination against older persons in favor of
younger ones. Whether the ADEA will successfully do so depends on the extent to which the three concepts of discrimination developed under Title VII-individual disparate treatment,
systemic disparate treatment, and systemic disparate impact-will
be applied in cases brought under the ADEA.
III.

INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT

As developed under Title VII, disparate treatment is the

most obvious theory of discrimination: the employer simply
treats some persons differently than others because of their age.
jobs" are permissible for older workers though not required of the employer. H.
Rep. No. 95-527 (July 25, 1977) at 12, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
25 See Note, supra note 22, at 832-36.
26 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note
10, at § 3.7.
27 See generally Note, supra note 22.
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Intent to discriminate, in the sense that the employer intended to
take age into account in its decision-making, is critical to finding
a violation. However, such intent need not be proven directly if
it can be inferred from the circumstances of the employer's decision. Disparate treatment comes in two varieties, individual and
systemic.
Similarly to Title VII, the courts have recognized several elements to an individual disparate treatment claim. The plaintiff,
who has the burden of persuasion, must establish that he was
treated differently than others because of age. This can be done
by either direct or indirect evidence.
A.

Proof of Discrimination Through Admissions by the Employer

The most obvious way of establishing disparate treatment is
by direct proof that adverse employment decisions are reached
for reasons based on age. This evidence could include facially
discriminatory company policies, facially discriminatory job orders with employment agencies,2 8 admissions by the defendant,29
or plaintiff's testimony as to reasons given by the defendant.3 0
Proof of such i'ntent to discriminate on age grounds must also be
linked causally to the employment decision challenged.
1. Facial Discrimination
An example of facial disparate treatment is found in the
Supreme Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston," l in which the defendant prohibited downbidding to the position of flight engineer by captains who were disqualified by a
Federal Aviation Administration rule from continued service as
pilots when they reached age 60. Captains who were unable to
continue as pilots for other reasons could downbid. The Court
held that this was, by definition, age discrimination:
In this case there is direct evidence that the method of transfer
available to a disqualified captain depends upon his age. Since
it allows captains who become disqualified for any reason
other than age to "bump" less senior flight engineers, TWA's
transfer policy is discriminatory on its face.3 2
28 Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977).
29 See Marshall v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
8056 (D. Utah 1977).
30 Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Schultz v.
Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
31 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
32 Id. at 121. The Court cited Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart,
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The Court explicitly rejected the defense's argument that the plaintiff was required to make out its case by the use of inferential methods to prove intent to discriminate. It also noted that, where a facial
age discrimination was concerned, it was irrelevant that the vast majority of captains were able to downbid successfully."3 Absent a facial discrimination, the impact of an employer's rules on the
protected group is relevant and perhaps determinative in drawing
the inference of intent to discriminate. 4 However, when there is a
facial discrimination, reduced impact simply narrows the number of
victims and does not affect the fact of discrimination.
Thurston clearly rejected the approach of several appellate decisions that refused to strike down facial age distinctions in employer
benefit plans.3 5 After Thurston, these decisions are plainly incorrect
insofar as they do not deem such distinctions to be age
discrimination. 6
2.

Admissions

Without being facially discriminatory, an employment decision may be shown by direct evidence to be motivated by age
discrimination through the defendant's admissions. For example, the Fifth Circuit regarded a personnel officer's notes expressing an age preference for employment as one ground for
435 U.S. 702 (1978), as an example of a policy facially discriminatory on the basis
of sex.
33 Thurston, 469 U.S. at 120 n.15. Most captains downbid before being disqualified by age to avoid the very rule challenged in Thurston.
34 See Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983). The majority in that case found that a policy of not
laying off employees who were students in a company educational program, all of
whom were under 40, did not constitute disparate treatment. Judge Sloviter
dissented.
35 See, e.g., Britt v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 768 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985)
(requiring pension-eligibles to defer pension benefits to obtain benefits of company
severance plan is not age discrimination); Electrical Workers (IBEW) v. Union Elec.
Co., 761 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1985) (insurance plan disqualifying workers over 40
from initial participation not "arbitrary age discrimination"). Contra EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725
F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
36 The cases viewed such age-based distinctions as rational in terms of the employer's goals. In other discrimination contexts, however, rationality has been held
to be no defense unless the distinction could be brought within a statutory exception. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). However, the distinctions may be justified under one of the statutory exceptions to the
ADEA. See, e.g., Patterson v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 742 F.2d 465 (8th
Cir. 1984) (voluntary early retirement program paying decreasing benefits the later
the retirement was legal within the "bona fide employee benefit plan" exception).
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proving disparate treatment.3 7 Other cases have relied at least in
part on statements by supervisors that the employee was "too
old" or that the company was looking for younger people. s8
If these statements are believed by the trier of fact, they establish the necessary intent to discriminate on account of age that
is essential to an individual disparate impact case. In such cases,
burden-shifting on the intent element is irrelevant.3 9 Nevertheless, all references to age do not constitute sufficient evidence of
intent to discriminate to require a finding on that issue, even if
the making of the statement is not denied. Some statements have
been dismissed as merely descriptive, not normative; 40 others
may be too remote in time or not sufficiently directed at the
plaintiff. Even statements directly indicative of preferences for
younger workers are not necessarily conclusive as to employer
liability for the violation charged. Most obviously, an established
employer preference for hiring younger people may not be sufficient to prove that a particular older worker was discharged be4
cause of her age, although it is some evidence on that point. '
Such a preference would be much stronger evidence that a particular older applicant for employment was not hired for age reasons, although even here there may be a question 42
whether such a
plaintiff would not have been hired in any event.
B.

Inferential Proofof Intent to Discriminate Without Admission
Evidence: The General Approach
As will typically be the case, where direct proof of discrimi-

37 Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972). There
was also statistical evidence of age discrimination in hiring. But see Surrisi v. Conwed Corp., 510 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1975).
38 Williams v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See
also Jackson v. Shell Oil Co., 702 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1983).
39 Hazelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1983).
40 Parker v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 741 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1984).
41 La Montagne v. American Convenience Prod., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.
1984); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.
1980).
42 See Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) § 7902 (D.N.M.
1977), af'd, 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980), in which, despite age-based recruitment
practices, the court refused to find a violation because of the absence of proof of a
single protected individual who was not hired. Contra, United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers, Local No. 36,416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969) (Title VII). While the absence
of effects of a discriminatory policy is relevant to the remedy, and perhaps to the
standing of a particular plaintiff, it can scarcely save the policy itself if attacked by a
plaintiff with proper standing.
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nation is lacking, the plaintiff must turn to inferential methods.4 3
This may be especially appropriate when the intent at issue is
subtle or even unconscious. 4 4 In individual disparate treatment,
the most analogous Title VII authority is McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green,4 5 in which the Supreme Court, addressing the "order
and allocation of proof in a private non-class action challenging
employment discrimination," held:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he
belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.4 6
In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,47 a later decision explicating McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court set out the
theoretic foundation for the elements it had listed. The importance
of McDonnell Douglas lay in "its recognition of the general principle
that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering
evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the
Act."' 4' The Court elaborated:
An employer's isolated decision to reject an applicant who belongs to a racial minority does not show that the rejection was
racially based. Although the McDonnell Douglas formula does
not require direct proof of discrimination, it does demand that
the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least that rejection
did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons
on which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an
absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a
vacancy in the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the
refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create
49
an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one.
43 There is no requirement that plaintiff produce any direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 26 (1987).
44 See Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154-55 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
45 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
46 Id. at 802.

47 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
48
49

Id. at 358.
Id. at 358 n.44.
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Once a prima facie case has been made out, McDonnell Douglas indicates that the burden shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 5 0
Subsequent Title VII cases, chiefly Texas Dep 't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine,5 t establish that the defendant's burden is not one of persuasion but merely one of production. That is, the employer must put
into evidence a reason that, if believed, would rebut the inference of
discrimination drawn from the plaintiff's prima facie case. However, the employer need not persuade the trier of fact that that reason is the true explanation for the challenged decision. The plaintiff
retains the burden of persuasion to show that the action was discriminatory, so plaintiff may still prevail by establishing that the reason was in fact a pretext for discrimination.5 2 Frequently, the
plaintiff's case will stand or fall on this determination. It is clear
under Title VII that the plaintiff always bears the burden of persuasion, but he need only establish his case by a preponderance of the
evidence.
The general application of the McDonnell Douglas approach in
ADEA cases is now clear,53 including the allocation of burdens of
proof.54 Nevertheless, the courts occasionally misconceive the nature of the inquiry. A good example is Stanajev v. Ebasco Serv., Inc. ,"
in which the Second Circuit recognized that there were at least four
methods of proving age discrimination. First, direct proof; second,
statistical evidence; third, the McDonnell Douglas approach, which the
court characterized as "establishing a set of circumstances which to50 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. See also Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062 (4th
Cir. 1980).

51

450 U.S. 248 (1981).

McDonnell Doulgas, 411 U.S. at 804. See also Haydon v. Rand Corp., 605 F.2d
453 (9th Cir. 1979); Hughes v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 585 F.2d 918 (8th
Cir. 1978).
53 See La Montagne v. American Convenience Prod., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th
Cir. 1984); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 585 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609
(5th Cir. 1977). See also Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958 (8th Cir.
1978). Although the McDonnell Douglas mode of analysis is applicable to ADEA
cases, it does not follow that the jury must be instructed in accordance with the
language of that case. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Co., 696 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir.
1983); Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980).
54 See, e.g., Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1982); Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying Burdine approach to trial judge's function in an ADEA jury case); Haring v. CPC Int'l, Inc.,
664 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Farah Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir.
1981); Bittar v. Air Canada, 512 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1975); Laugesen v. Anaconda
Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
55 643 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1981).
52
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gether raise an inference of discrimination;"" and, finally, other circumstantial evidence. While correct in segregating out direct and
statistical proof of discrimination, this approach reads McDonnell
Douglas too narrowly. Ultimately, the third and fourth categories described by the Stanajev court merge into one: absent direct or statistical evidence, what facts will give rise to an inference of
discrimination? Narrowly viewed, McDonnell Douglas provides a
laundry list of circumstances from which an inference of discrimination will be drawn. But viewed broadly, McDonnell Douglas simply
states that plaintiff's proof eliminating the typical nondiscriminatory
explanations for a decision leaves the obvious inference to be drawn
that the decision was motivated by a discriminatory intent. 57 Indeed, the Supreme Court has been explicit on this point, recognizing under Title VII that the McDonnell Douglas scheme is not
exhaustive and that other proof may suffice to establish a prima facie
58
case.

While the McDonnell Douglas approach seems clearly to be applicable to ADEA cases, it does not follow that an inference of age
discrimination will be drawn as readily as might an inference of race
discrimination. In Stanajev, for example, the court rejected certain
circumstances as sufficient predicates for an inference of age discrimination. For instance, the court held that the defendant's study
of the pending extension of ADEA protection to age 70 was not probative of an intent to fire the 63-year old plaintiff. Second, company
projections of the plaintiff's pension benefits at different hypothetical retirement dates did not give rise to an inference of discrimination, at least where the company derived little benefit from early
discharge. Third, a possible violation of defendant's normal termination procedure, as established by company policy, was not probative of age discrimination in the absence of any proof that
comparable younger employees were treated any better.
The reluctance to find even prima facie age discrimination on
equivocal evidence long predates Stanajev. In one of the first appellate ADEA cases, Laugesen v. Anaconda Co.," the Sixth Circuit indicated that in a "proper case," McDonnell Douglas elements could be
applied in ADEA litigation, but stated that "we believe it would be
inappropriate simply to borrow and apply them automatically." 6
56
57
58

Id. at 920.

60

Id. at 312.

See Parker v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n., 741 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1984).
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. This holding was reaffirmed in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
59 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
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The normal replacement with younger workers of older workers
who retire is not necessarily discriminatory, so it would be wrong to
draw an inference of discrimination based on a replacement employee being younger than the plaintiff:
The progression of age is a universal human process. In the
very nature of the problem, it is apparent that in the usual
case, absent any discriminatory intent, discharged employees
will more often than not be replaced by those younger than
they, for older employees are constantly moving out of the labor market, while younger ones move in. This factor of progression and replacement is not necessarily involved in cases
involving the immutable characteristics of race, sex and national origin.6 1
This argument, although superficially appealing, is ultimately unpersuasive. Since McDonnell Douglas requires, inter alia, that the
plaintiff demonstrate her qualifications, any adverse personnel action taken with respect to such a person is suspicious enough to require justification. The Laugesen opinion to the contrary
notwithstanding, the plaintiff was not leaving the labor market for
apparently legitimate reasons, that is, because she was disqualified
by age or any other factor. Since a nondiscriminatory basis for the
employer's decision is not obvious, the prima facie case should be
established, certainly if replacement by a younger person is also
shown.
C. Inferential Proof.Establishingan ADEA Prima Facie Case
Tracking McDonnell Douglas, ADEA cases generally use that
opinion's four-pronged specification, but the courts adapt it to
the more common situation under the ADEA-a discharge rather
than a refusal to hire.6 2 The best reasoned cases recognize that
various formulations are useful to achieve the purpose of McDonnell Douglas, which is to decide whether it is appropriate to infer
discriminatory intent. As one court stated the principle:
[A] determination [of a prima facie case of disparate treatment] turns on whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient
Id. at 313 n.4. The court also stressed that ADEA cases may be tried to ajury,
while Title VII cases are not. However, the basis of this distinction is mystifying,
because under either statute a judge will initially pass on the sufficiency of the evidence as to each element of a cause of action.
62 See, e.g., Pace v. Southern Rwy. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383 (1 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230 (4th
Cir. 1982); Cova v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978); Price
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977).
61
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evidence to provide a basis for an inference that age was a factor in the employment decision. Any particular test is only a
tool to facilitate evaluation of the proof and to aid the court in
evaluating whether a basis for an inference of discrimination
has been created.63
This formulation not only opens the way to recognition that particular "prongs" of McDonnell Douglas may not have to be met to establish a prima facie case, 64 but also that formally meeting some prongs
may not suffice. For example, replacement by a younger worker,
within or without the protected group, 6 5 may be a basis for an inference of discrimination when the worker is substantially younger,6 6
but may not suffice when the replacement is only marginally
younger. Despite this, it is useful to examine some of the decisions
focusing on what establishes a prima facie case in various
situations .67

1.

Membership in the Protected Class

The first element of the plaintiff's prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is a showing "that he belongs to a racial minority." 6 In the ADEA context this means that the plaintiff is a
member of the protected age group, that is, that he is 40 or
above. Although not frequently addressed in the decisions,
proof that the employee or applicant is within this group is essential to the prima facie case. Further, in disparate treatment cases,
which necessarily involve an intent to discriminate, the plaintiff
must show the employer's knowledge of the employee's age.6 9
But in most cases knowledge could be imputed from the employee's appearance or personnel records. 0
Pace, 701 F.2d at 1386-87.
See, e.g.,
Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129-30 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 943 (1982).
65 Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l., 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1057 (1986); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., 758 F.2d 1435 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1005 (1985); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633
(5th Cir. 1985); Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 562 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984); McCorstin v. United States Steel
Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980).
66 Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981).
67 See Maxfield, 766 F.2d at 793 (dictum); Pace, 701 F.2d at 1390 (two year age
differential not enough, at least without additional statistical or other showing of
discrimination).
68 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
69 See Currier v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 567 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978); Kincaid
v. United Steelworkers of Am., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8462 (N.D. Inc. 1972).
70 Hodgson v. Earnest Machine Prod. Inc., 479 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1973). See
63
64
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Application/Qualification/Vacancy

The second element in the McDonnell Douglas specification is
that the plaintiff must show "that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants.'
Obviously, this requires some adjustment when applied to the more
common ADEA case challenging discharge.
The purpose of the application requirement is simply to
demonstrate the employer's knowledge of the plaintiff's availability at the time of the challenged action. Even in a hiring case,
an actual application is not a necessary precondition for recovery. 7 2 Rather, the first prong of the second element of McDonnell
Douglas merely requires a plaintiff in a hiring case to prove that he
either was an applicant or, but for the discrimination, would have
been an applicant. 73 In a discharge case, the application requirement means only that the plaintiff had been interested in retaining employment. So phrased, this element eliminates only
plaintiffs who voluntarily retired or otherwise voluntarily left
74
their employment.
Another part of this element requires proof of a vacancy,
that is, that defendant was seeking to fill a job that was available.
The existence of a vacancy is, of course, critical to backpay recovery because absent a vacancy, the discrimination cannot "cause"
plaintiff's harm. Thus, while it is possible to violate the statute
even when a vacancy does not exist (a sign reading "No persons
over 60 need apply"), the relief available in such a situation
would only be injunctive. In any event, the existence or nonexistence of a vacancy will not normally pose serious legal problems
in hiring cases: the issues are likely to be solely ones of fact.
also Billingsley v. Service Technology Corp., 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8874 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
71 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
72 In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that individual relief in a pattern-or-practice Title VII suit was
available even to those who had not applied for jobs: "[w]hen a person's desire for
a job is not translated into a formal application solely because of his unwillingness
to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who
goes through the motions of submitting an application." Id. at 365-66.
73 See Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972)
(EPA) (a fact question about whether a prospective employee was "persuaded" not
to apply for a particular position).
74 There will of course frequently be questions about whether an employee's
retirement was truly voluntary or whether it was coerced by threat of discharge of
demotion. Compare Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 454 (1987), with Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 813 F.2d 583 (2d
Cir. 1987).
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This is not' true, however, with respect to discharge cases.
While an employer may discharge an older worker and then replace her (in which case it is fair to describe the situation as involving a vacancy) a more common scenario is an employer's
"reduction in force." The ADEA would be violated if an employer's reduction in force discriminated on account of age in
deciding which employees to terminate.7 5 In such cases, the
courts have reformulated this part of the test in various ways,
usually eliminating it as a separate element and requiring only
that the plaintiff prove that she was "qualified" for the job from
which she was dismissed.
The last prong of the second element of McDonnell Douglas
requires that plaintiff show his qualifications for the job. This is
perhaps the most difficult question in employment discrimination
law, and McDonnell Douglas casts little light on it. In that case, the
plaintiff was a former employee of the defendant who had been
doing apparently satisfactory work when he was laid off for economic reasons. When the defendant commenced new hiring,
there could be no question as to the plaintiff's basic qualifications. Obviously, in cases of new hiring when the plaintiff has
never worked for the employer before, there is a serious initial
question as to how a plaintiff proves he is qualified. For purposes
of a prima facie hiring case, the general principle that has
emerged is that the plaintiff need only prove that he met the minimal objective qualifications for the job 76 -the ones stated in the
advertisement, for example, or those objective qualifications actually possessed by the successful candidate. Proof that the
plaintiff was better-qualified than the successful candidate is not
75 The error of the contrary view is illustrated by Price v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977), in which the court held that plaintiff did not establish
a prima facie case because he failed to prove the existence of a job vacancy when
the defendant hired no one to replace plaintiff when it eliminated his position entirely. This mechanical application of McDonnell Douglas is untrue both to the letter
and the spirit of that decision, and the Fifth Circuit later explicitly recognized that
prima facie cases can be made out even in reduction-in-force situations. Williams v.
General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455'U.S. 943
(1982); McCuen v. Home Ins. Co., 633 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1981); McCorstin v.
United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980). Accord, Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 237 n.5 (4th Cir. 1982); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600
F.2d 1003, 1012-1013 (1st Cir. 1979).
76 The existence of such objective qualifications may raise disparate impact
questions. For example, suppose an employer requires that its employees pass a
particular test. Obviously, plaintiff could establish his minimal qualifications by
showing that he satisfied this standard, but if the plaintiff failed the test, he might
also be able to claim that the requirement was illegal under disparate impact analysis. See infra § V; see also EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at § 4.5.4.
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necessary in the prima facie case,77 although it may be critical to
prove pretext when the successful competitor is also at least minimally qualified in objective terms.
In discharge cases, however, the qualification question is of
considerably less significance because employees have presumably met at least minimal qualification standards in order to be
hired originally. In such cases, an employee may be able to establish the qualification element merely by showing that she was
doing apparently satisfactory work. 78 At least one court upheld a
motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff in which, in
the absence of other evidence of age motivation in a termination,
it was undisputed that the plaintiff's job performance had fallen
off before termination; in these circumstances the plaintiff had
failed to make out a prima facie case.79
In short, the necessity of proof of plaintiff's qualifications
has varied. The results can be reconciled by understanding that,
where the plaintiff was employed and has been discharged or demoted, it may normally be proper to infer qualification on a minimal showing because there is no obvious reason why the
employee's qualifications have deteriorated. However, on a failure to hire or promote, a stronger showing of qualifications by
the plaintiff may be necessary to negate the absence of those
qualifications as a nondiscriminatory basis for the employer's
decision. 8 °
For example, the more typical cases in the hiring context
arise where there are more minimally qualified applicants than
there arejobs. Further, in the discharge setting, usually in reductions in force, there is a question of comparative qualification of
the persons returning with the persons laid off, complicated by
the fact that in some cases the job in question has been completely eliminated.
In hiring cases, does the fourth element require an applicant
See, e.g., Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981).
The formulation generally accepted is that plaintiff "is required to show that
he was 'qualified' in the sense that he was doing his job well enough to rule out the
possibility that he was fired for inadequate job performance, absolute or 'relative.' "
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013-1014 (1st Cir. 1979). Accord, Halsell v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205
(1983). See also Coburn v. Pan Am. Airways, 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.); cert. denied,
464 U.S. 994 (1983); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
79 Huhn v. Koehring Co., 718 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1983).
80 See Pace v. Southern Rwy. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1018 (1984); Ford v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 117, 118-119 n.2
(5th Cir. 1981).
77
78

820

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:803

to prove she is as qualified, or more qualified, than the person
who was awarded the job? The Supreme Court intimated that
the answer is in the affirmative when, in InternationalBrotherhoodof
Teamsters v. United States,8 . the Court described McDonnell Douglas
as requiring the plaintiff to prove, inter' alia, that the employer's
action was not due to plaintiff's "absolute or relative lack of qualifications.". 2 Arguably, a prima facie case is not established by a
plaintiff who proves merely that he was treated less favorably
than a younger person; the plaintiff must also show that the
younger person was less qualified in order to raise the inference
of age discrimination. On the other hand, if the rejected applicant can demonstrate superiority in every legitimate respect, the
prima facie case would clearly be established, and the opportunities for the employer's explanation would, by definition, be very
narrow.
But this approach imposes severe difficulties for plaintiffs in
the usual case in which the qualifications will not objectively rank
candidates relative to one another. Since job competitors will
typically vary in diverse respects, rarely will the plaintiff be able
to show superiority, or even equality, in every possible respect.
Accordingly, perhaps a prima facie case is made out if the plaintiff, having established the other elements, also shows merely that
the successful competitor is not in the protected class.8 3 After
all, the defendant has rejected a protected person and chosen another when both are minimally qualified. While the successful
competitor may well be more qualified, the bases for that judgment are solely within the defendant's knowledge, and the defendant can come forward with an explanation in accordance
with the McDonnell Douglas scheme for allocating burdens. While
superficially such a rule seems to conflict with the language in
Teamsters, that language is not only dictum but also does not
clearly address a situation in which comparative qualifications
above minimal requirements are indeterminant. Absent such a
rule, age discrimination may go largely unchallenged except in
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Id. at 358 n.44.
83 If the competitor is within the protected group, the inference of age discrimination.is less likely. It must be remembered, however, that discrimination within
the protected group is also barred. Thus, replacement of a 63 year-old by a 41
year-old may suggest discrimination even if replacement of a person aged 56 by
someone aged 54 would not. See Pace v. Southern Ry. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d
230, 242 n.13 (4th Cir. 1982); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 n.9 (1st
Cir. 1979).
81
82
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those instances where the prima facie case can be buttressed by a
statistical showing.
Turning to discharge cases, there will be some instances in
which a former employee will be replaced by a younger person.
In such settings, the courts can be expected to find the prima
facie case established without requiring the plaintiff to show that
he was as qualified or more qualified than his younger replacement. s4 Further, the courts have rejected the argument that the
replacement be from outside the protected age group. In part,
this may be because the ADEA also bars age discrimination
within the protected group, but it also reflects a perception that
age discrimination may be more subtle:
[a] requirement that the replacement be from a nonprotected
group fails to take the reality of the working place into account. Because of the value of experience, rarely are sixtyyear-olds replaced by those under forty. The replacement
process is more subtle but just as injurious to the person who
has been discharged. That the person is replaced by a person
who is ten years younger rather than twenty years does not
diminish8 5 the discrimination: the subtlety only tends to disguise it.

The more typical age discrimination suit, however, is one involving an individual discharge or a general reduction in force
where there is no replacement; rather, the position in question is
eliminated. The question arises whether the plaintiff's prima facie
case must include a showing that he is as qualified or more qualified
than persons who were not terminated.
In some instances involving individual discharges, the courts
have been willing to find a prima facie case when an older worker
can prove merely that he was doing his job well enough to meet his
employer's legitimate expectations.8 6 In other cases, which the
courts have characterized as reductions in force,8 7 there are largescale retrenchments; because a number ofjobs are being eliminated
by the employer, the inference of discrimination that may flow from
the discharge of an older worker doing apparently satisfactory work
See Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981).
85 McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980).
Accord, McCuen v. Home Ins. Co., 633 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1981).
86 See, e.g., La Montagne v. American Convenience Prod., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405
(7th Cir. 1984). But see Huhn v. Koehring, 718 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1983).
87 See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
84
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in inoperative., 8 Put another way, the nondiscrimination reason for
the discharge-the reduction in force-is apparent on its face, and
the employee must produce further evidence to raise an inference of
discriminatory intent. 89 Usually, this evidence will be the retention
of younger workers, 9 ° but some courts have required something
more than a showing of retention of a younger person in order to
establish a prima facie case. 9 '
3.

Rejection

Perhaps the most easily satisfied of the McDonnell Douglas elements is the third, which requires that "despite his qualifications,
[plaintiff] was rejected." 9 2 Formal rejection will, of course, suffice, but failure to act on an application for an unreasonable
length of time should be deemed the equivalent of rejection, at
least for purposes of the plaintiff's prima facie case.
In cases of employment termination, the analogous issue is
whether the employee voluntarily quit or was discharged.93
Many ADEA cases involve reductions in force, in which an employee can choose early retirement; when that choice is truly voluntary, there can be no age discrimination against the retiree.9 4
But in some situations, the option of early retirement is merely
the lesser of two evils, because the employer threatens-expressly or implicitly-discharge, demotion, or transfer as the alternative. When the employee has formally sought early
retirement, establishing this prong of the prima facie case re88 LaGrant v. Gulf& Western Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1984); Parcinski
v. Outlet Co., 673 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983).
89 Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1985); Matthews v.
Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1985); Thornbrough v. Columbus &
Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985); Williams v. General Motors
Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 128-129, (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
90 See Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Co., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984); EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.
1983); Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983); Stanojev v. Ebasco Serv., Inc., 643 F.2d 914,
920-921 (2d Cir. 1981).
9' Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1985); Sahadi v. Reynolds
Chem. Co., 636 F.2d 1116, 1117 (6th Cir. 1980). See also LaGrant v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1984).
92 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
93 Tribble v. Western Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1080 (1983).
94 Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982). It is, of
course, a separate question whether other workers who are not offered an early
retirement option may have an ADEA claim on that basis.
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quires proof that she in fact did so under pressure. 95 Further,
under the ADEA, as under Title VII, the notion of constructive
discharge should be applicable. 9 6
4.

Continuing Open Position

The fourth element of McDonnell Douglas is that "after [plaintiff's] rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." 9' 7 This element poses no problems under facts such
as those in McDonnell Douglas itself where the job in question remained open after plaintiff's application was rejected. Nor is it
much of an extension of McDonnell Douglas to reach situations
where the position is no longer open because it was filled by a
person of another race or, in the ADEA cases, a younger applicant. But a problem arises in the more typical age discrimination
cases where there are large-scale reductions in force. In such instances it will sometimes be possible to show that, under one
name or another, the plaintiff's job was in fact assigned to a
younger worker. But in the greater number of cases, the job will
have been entirely eliminated. In those situations, the courts will
require some proof that the employer's selection of which jobs to
cut was influenced by the age of the person holding those jobs. 9
D.

Inferential Proof: Defendant's Rebuttal and Pretext

The elements of the prima facie case are only the first part of
the three-step McDonnell Douglas mode of analysis. If plaintiff
makes out such a case, the defendant then has the burden of production under Title VII to come forth with a nondiscriminatory
reason. Should the defendant carry that burden, the Title VII
plaintiff may still carry her ultimate burden of persuasion on the
issue of disparate treatment by showing that the defendant's reason is in fact pretext.
Just as the prima facie analysis of Title VII has been carried
over largely intact to the ADEA, so has Title VII law concerning
the defendant's burden of production and plaintiff's opportunity
95 See Carpenter v. Continental Trailways, 446 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Tenn. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981). See
also Toussaint v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1978).
96 See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at § 4.2.3.
97 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
98 Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129-130 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
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to prove pretext. 99 The defendant clearly has no burden of persuasion that the nondiscriminatory reason in fact motivated the
adverse action, but it does have to present this reason "through
the introduction of admissible evidence."'' 0 That is, the mere
assertion of such reason in the argument of counsel or in answer
to a complaint will not suffice. 1 1
Under the ADEA, any reason that is not an "age" reason will
suffice to carry the defendant's burden of production. 10 2 However, as a practical matter, the more idiosyncratic and the less
business-related the employer's asserted reasons are, the less
likely the trier of fact is to believe that they are the true reasons.
Nevertheless, if the trier of fact believes the asserted non-age reasons are the employer's real reasons, the defendant should prevail. This is true even if the asserted reasons are otherwise
illegal, although the court might then enter judgment of liability
on other grounds. 10 3 It must be remembered, however, that not
all seemingly innocent reasons are unrelated to age. For example, a discharge of the "most senior" workers in terms ofjob tenure may be so highly correlated with age and so contrary to
normal seniority principles that it would be held to be an age
reason.
Some courts have concluded that the employer's carrying of
its McDonnell Douglas burden of production eliminates the plaintiff's prima facie case in the sense that there is no longer necessarily a jury issue. To create such an issue, the plaintiff must
prove pretext.' 0 4 For example, in Elliot v. Group Medical & Surgical
99

E.g., Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 648 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1981).

100 Davis v. Combustion Eng., Inc., 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
101 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
102 Contra, Player, Proofof Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REv. 621, 654 (1983) (certain
"illegitimate" reasons ought not to count.)
1o3 For example, if the plaintiff sued on age grounds and the defendant denied
age discrimination by claiming that it was really plaintiff's race that led to his exclusion, the appropriate response would seem to find a Title VII violation. Failure of
the plaintiff to follow Title VII procedures should be excused in this exceptional
circumstance.
104 Palmer v. District Bd. of Trustees of St. Petersburg, 748 F.2d 595 (1 1th Cir.
1984) (decision not to renew plaintiff's contract as teacher in order to hire black
replacement defeated claim of age discrimination); Pace v. Southern Rwy Sys., 701
F.2d 1383 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Simmons v. McGuffey
Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980) (summary judgment for defendants). As one court wrote: "[t]hus, unlike Humpty-Dumpty, the employee's prima
facie case can be put back together again, through proof that the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual." Thombrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760
F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1985).
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Serv., Inc. ,1o5 the appellate court, in reviewing a jury verdict for
plaintiff, conceded that a prima facie case had been established.
The company, however, offered reasons for the discharge of the
plaintiff that were not "irrational or idiosyncratic." The plaintiff
then failed to challenge the accuracy of the defendant's reasons,
instead merely denying that such a reason was an adequate basis
for termination. The court held that the plaintiff's case was insufficient to go to the jury. Absent admissions, the court thought
the plaintiff must prove the intent by showing that the stated reasons were inaccurate, or by proof that the reasons, though accurate, were not the true basis for the termination, as by showing
10 6
younger persons who were not terminated for such reasons.
But there can be no general rule as to whether distinct proof
of pretext must be put in by the plaintiff in order to get to the
jury. The ultimate question is always whether there is enough
evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer intent to discriminate. 10 7 Certainly, there are some nondiscriminatory reasons
that, once they are put into evidence by the defendant eliminate
the inference of discrimination warranted by the prima facie case
because a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff.1 0 8 For
example, an older employee who shows he was doing satisfactory
work before his discharge might establish a prima facie case, but
an employer's proof that the employee murdered a co-worker' 0 9
would provide a nondiscriminatory reason for an employer action that otherwise lacked rational explanation. If no reasonable
jury could doubt the employer's proof, plaintiff's case will not
even go to the jury unless plaintiff advances evidence of pretext-for example, that he had not really attacked his fellow
worker or that younger workers who committed similar assaults
were not discharged.
While there are some instances in which the employer's satisfaction of its burden of production might justify a directed verdict against the plaintiff if she does not advance other proof of
pretext, in most cases the mere articulation of a nondiscriminatory reason should not suffice to take the case from the jury: the
prima facie case may be strong enough, and the articulated rea714 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
Accord, Bohrer v. Hanes Corp., 715 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1026 (1984) (upholding judgment n.o.v. for defendant).
107 See Ridenour v. Lawson Co., 791 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1986).
108 But see Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 640.
109 See Carter v. Maloney Trucking & Storage Co., 631 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1980).
See also Houser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980).
105
106
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son so unlikely, that a jury question is created. Nevertheless,
some courts have shown a surprising tendency to grant summary
judgments, directed verdicts, or judgment n.o.v. in ADEA
0
cases. 11
It should be noted that in addition to putting into evidence a
nondiscriminatory reason for the action adverse to the plaintiff,
employers have sometimes tried to defend their conduct-especially in reduction-in-force cases-by showing that there has been
no overall adverse impact on older workers. Such evidence is
probative on the intent issue,"' but it is not conclusive. 11 2 The
fact that the employer does not generally discriminate against a
specific group does not prove that a particular decision was not
biased. 1 13
Most ADEA litigation has focused on the area of explanation
and pretext. For example, in Mistretta v. Sandia Corp.,"' the defendant claimed that several individual employees were chosen
for layoff due to nondiscriminatory performance ratings. The
court of appeals, however, held that the fact that the performance
rating system had been held earlier to be inherently biased
against other older persons established that the alleged nondiscriminatory reason was in fact pretext.
In responding to defendant's explanation by proving pretext, the plaintiff may seek to establish that the asserted reason is
false in the sense that it is inapplicable to her." 5 Alternatively,
the plaintiff might admit the reason to be true, but show that it
does not explain the decision. For example, if the employer
claims the employee was discharged for tardiness, the plaintiff
might either deny the tardiness or admit that he was frequently
late but claim that younger persons were also late and were not
110 Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). See also Sahadi v. Reynolds Chem., 636 F.2d 1116 (6th
Cir. 1980) (affirming directed verdict for failure to establish prima facie case where
cutback led to plaintiff's layoff and assumption of his duties by younger person);
Houser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding grant of
judgment n.o.v. to defendant that had fired plaintiff, a dedicated, hard-working employee with 18 years of service, allegedly for dishonesty engaged in for the employer's best interests; plaintiff was replaced by person half his age). But see
Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 640.
111 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Ridenour v. Lawson
Co., 791 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1986).
112 See Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 644-45.
113 See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Cooper v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
114 649 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1981).
115 E.g., Golumb v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 688 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1982).
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fired because of it. If the plaintiff cannot prove the falsity of the
employer's reason, the next best way of proving pretext is to
demonstrate that younger persons were treated more favorably
in regard to the asserted reason." 6
Pretext, however, can be shown in a number of other ways.
For example, if others-even older workers-were not fired for
engaging in similar conduct, there is at least a question as to
whether the employer's asserted reason is the real basis. If it is
discredited, the trier of fact is at least permitted, and perhaps
reason for the adverse action
required, to conclude that the 1real
7
was the age of the employee.
Another method of proving pretext is to show that the employer violated its own procedures or standards to the disadvantage of an older plaintiff. While not illegal per se under the
ADEA, such violation can be probative of discrimination.
E. Causation
Speaking broadly, the courts have been concerned not only
with finding an intent to discriminate (which is definitional where
direct proof of intent is believed) but also in establishing causation,-that is, that the intent to discriminate actually caused the
harm of which the plaintiff is complaining. This causation question arises both in the case of direct proof of discriminatory intent and in cases where the intent is inferred.
Under the ADEA the causation inquiry is usually phrased in
terms of whether age is a "determinative" or "determining" factor. This question involves two interrelated aspects: first, the
substantive law and, second, the procedural allocation of burdens of proof.
On the former point, it is generally held that the age factor
must be determinative: if the adverse employment decision
would not have occurred but for age, there is a violation." 18 This
116 See, e.g., Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir.
1982).
117 Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1087 (1984) ("a showing that a proffered justification is pretextual is itself
equivalent to a finding that the employer intentionally discriminated").
118 Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984) ("The jury
must understand that it is not enough that age discrimination figure in the decision
to demote or discharge; age must 'make a difference' between termination and retention of the employee in the sense that 'but for' the factor of age, the employee
would not have been adversely affected."); La Montagne v. American Convenience
Prod., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Co., 696 F.2d
1176 (6th Cir. 1983); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Cancellier
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means that even the existence of an age-based policy, while certainly in the abstract a violation of the statute, will not necessarily
require judgment for a particular plaintiff because
he may have
19
age."
than
other
reasons
for
terminated
been
The second point, the burden of proof as to whether age was
a determinative factor, has generated considerably more controversy. From a theoretical perspective, the appropriate approach
is that utilized by the Supreme Court in comparable situations: if
the plaintiff can carry her burden of persuasion that the defendant utilized an impermissible consideration in an employment
decision, the plaintiff should prevail unless the employer can
shoulder the burden of persuasion in demonstrating that the adverse decision would have been the same even without the impermissible factor. 2 ' This approach is appealing on several levels,
not the least of which is the fact that once the plaintiff has proved
that age played any role in an adverse decision, she has proved a
violation of the statute, and she has a right under the ADEA to be
considered for employment opportunities without regard to her
age. The question whether the role was determinative in, say, a
discharge is more a question of the appropriate remedy, and it is
established in a number of contexts that once a violation is
proven, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that par2
ticular harms did not follow.' '

Although some cases accept this reasoning, 2 2 there are a
number of ADEA decisions that, in addition to requiring a showing that age be a determinative factor in a particular decision,
also place the burden of persuasion on that point on the plaintiff.
Although many of these decisions can be dismissed as unconsidered dicta, 12 1 the very repetition of descriptions of the plaintiff's
v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859
(1982); Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983); Haring v. CPC Intl., Inc., 664 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir.
1981); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981); Smithers v. Bailer, 629 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600
F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
119 E.g., EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1985).
120 Mt. Healthy City School Dist., v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See also NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); Village of Arlington Hts.
v. Metro Housing Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 271 n.21 (1977).
121 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86.
122 E.g., EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1985);
Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980).
123 E.g., La Montagne v. American Convenience Prod., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th
Cir. 1984); Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221 (11 th Cir. 1982);
Smithers v. Bailer, 629 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1980).
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burden as including proof that intent to discriminate is a determinative factor will be an obstacle to incorporating into the
ADEA the analysis used by the Supreme Court in analogous
areas.
IV.

SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT

The theory of systemic disparate treatment discrimination is
applicable to the ADEA, as well as under Title VII. Systemic disparate treatment has in common with individual disparate treatment the requirement of intent to discriminate. The basic
differences between the theories lie in, first, the breadth of discrimination proven and, second, the method of proof. Under
systemic disparate treatment the plaintiff seeks to demonstrate
that discrimination, rather than being an isolated phenomenon,
is pervasive with a particular employer. 124 In some cases, the systemic case is easily established because the125 employer has engaged in an explicitly discriminatory policy.

In most cases, however, the method of showing this is primarily statistical, although a statistical systemic case can be buttressed by evidence of discrimination in the form of admissions
of discriminatory intent and by the kind of inferential proof of
discriminatory intent use in individual cases. If a case of systemic
treatment is proven, the employer will be liable unless it can establish one of the statutory defenses, such as proving age as a
bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq), or that the discrimination is permissible under a bona fide benefit plan.
An example of the systemic disparate treatment case in the
ADEA context is found in Mistretta 126 in which the defendant was
a government contractor whose business, and therefore employment, varied substantially depending on federal appropriations.
At issue in the case was a large-scale reduction in force in 1973
designed to cut the employee rolls by some eleven percent.
Although the method of determining who was to be terminated
was complicated, the plaintiff established through statistical evidence that the effects of the cuts were disproportionately suffered
by certain categories of older workers. Further, statisticians testified that the pattern of adverse effect was statistically signifi124 See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at ch. 3 (Title VII).
125 See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121.

126 649 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1981); see also supra note 114 (discussion of Mistretta).
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cant. 1 2 7 The court found that this pattern established a prima
facie case of disparate treatment, which the defendant failed to
rebut. Although the layoffs were made according to a system for
evaluating individual employees, the court found that the evaluation system was extremely subjective and had never been validated. At least in the context of direct evidence of discriminatory
attitudes towards older workers, the court found that such a system was too susceptible to discriminatory use to defeat plaintiff'S
case.
Although there are aspects of disparate impact analysis in
Mistretta, the case clearly illustrates how a large-scale reduction in
force can become a textbook exercise in the application of statistical analysis to prove a correlation between age and layoff in order to make out a prima facie case of systemic disparate
treatment.
As with analogous Title VII cases, the theory of systemic disparate treatment under the ADEA has both its strengths and its
weaknesses. Its major limitation is the requirement that there be
sufficient numbers of employees involved before the theory is
available. Several courts have cautioned that the numbers used
for statistical analysis must be large enough to yield significant
28
results.1
Another potential limitation on the use of systemic disparate
treatment emerges from the hesitation of some courts to use statistical analysis in ADEA cases because of perceived unique as29
pects of age discrimination. This argument, as noted earlier,
although superficially appealing, is ultimately unpersuasive as a
bar to the use of statistical analysis under the ADEA. It may have
value, however, with respect to the kind of statistical analysis
made. For example, perhaps statistics showing that an employer's workforce is getting "younger" should be accorded less
significance, in light of the natural exit of older workers and entry
of younger ones, than would statistics showing a workforce to be
getting "whiter." More accurately, the correct use of statistics
would take this factor into account by determining if there are
fewer older workers present (or more older workers discharged)
than legitimate employment factors would indicate. In Mistretta,
127 The use of statistics in general and the meaning of statistical significance is
discussed in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at § 3.4.
128 See, e.g., Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984); Parker v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 741 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1984)..
129 See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at § 3.6.
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for example, the court had to factor out of its analysis those employees who were taking truly voluntary retirement: such persons
should not be used to decide whether the employer was discriminating against older workers in deciding who to terminate.
Of course, as with Title VII, a statistical showing of discrimination is not the end of the matter. The defendant can try to
rebut the showing either by challenging the raw data or the statistical methodology, or by showing nondiscriminatory reasons that
explain the statistical picture and rebut the inference of intent to
discriminate on age grounds. For example, suppose the employer in Mistretta could establish that the suspect pattern of terminations resulted solely because older workers happened to be
concentrated in an older department, which was entirely eliminated because it was technologically obsolete. If the trier of fact
believed this claim, the inference of discriminatory intent drawn
from the statistics would be rebutted.
Alternatively, the employer might admit the discrimination
reflected in the statistics but try to justify it, as by proving that
age-related policies are legitimate under the bfoq exception.
This defense, however, is an affirmative one in the sense that the
defendant bears the burden of persuasion.
Still a third possibility should be considered: the employer
could admit the adverse effect on older workers but claim that it
simply reflected an age-related decline in job performance of
older workers. After all, the fact that a test disproportionately
excludes blacks does not establish that its adoption was motivated by racial discrimination. So long as layoffs were the result
of nondiscriminatory individual evaluations, the fact that older
workers performed less well than younger ones should not bar
the defense. Of course, any such argument must admit that such
evaluations have at least a disparate impact on older workers; the
employer may have to be prepared not merely to prove the good
faith of the evaluations but also to establish business necessity for
them if the disparate impact theory is available under the ADEA.
V.

SYSTEMIC DiSPARATE IMPACT

The purposes of the ADEA are "to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment .... ,,130 Maxi130 29 U.S.C. § 621(b), § 2(b) (1985).

See generally Note, Age Discrimination in Em-

ployment: Correctinga Constitutionally Infirm LegislativeJudgment, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV.
1311 (1974).
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mum effectuation of these purposes, within the limits of the Act's
coverage, requires acceptance of both the "disparate treatment"
and "disparate impact" definitions of discrimination developed
under Title VII. As has been seen, disparate treatment, both individual and systemic, requires proof of intent to discriminate.
The disparate impact theory, on the other hand, finds discrimination in the even-handed application of facially-neutral employment policies that, regardless of intent, adversely impact on older
workers. The employer can, however, justify such policies by establishing that they are a business necessity.
Disparate impact emerged as a theory of discrimination
under Title VII in the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 131
and the close relationship of the ADEA to Title VII led many to
conclude that the disparate impact model also applies to age discrimination. 132 The most obvious basis for such a view was simply that the language of Title VII, which Griggs had held to
prohibit disparate impact discrimination, is virtually identical to
that in the ADEA. This is scarcely surprising because the ADEA
was largely modeled on Title VII. This modeling was in fact the
second basic argument for recognition of an ADEA disparate impact theory paralleling Title VII's. Finally, the administrative
agencies charged with enforcing the statute have adopted a disparate impact definition. Thus, the Interpretive Bulletin, issued
by the Department of Labor, which was originally charged with
ADEA enforcement, took this approach.'
When the EEOC assumed ADEA enforcement3 4 responsibilities, it explicitly adopted
the disparate impact test.

Nevertheless, there remains some dispute about the appropriateness of a disparate impact test under the ADEA, with several contrary arguments being advanced. First, it has been
suggested that the "reasonable factors other than age" defense
131 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
132 See Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discriminationin
Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979); Note, Proving Discrimination Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 17 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 495 (1975).
133 For example, uniformly-applied physical fitness requirements are permissible
if they "are reasonably necessary for the specific work to be performed." 29 C.F.R.
§ 860.103(f)(1) (1986). Since uniform application of such requirements to old and
young alike would normally satisfy the disparate treatment test, the additional requirement of job relation evidenced a disparate impact analysis. A more detailed
analysis of the original Interpretive Bulletin is found in C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER &
R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.5
(1980).
'34 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1986).
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in the ADEA, which has no precise parallel in Title VII, explicitly
permits practices that are not motivated by discriminatory intent. 3 5 But this argument seems flawed. To being with, it assumes the answer: are "other than age" factors ones that are
other than age in the disparate treatment sense, or may they be
factors other than age in both the disparate treatment and disparate impact meanings? 3 6 Even more fundamentally, the phrasing of this exception contrasts sharply with its Equal Pay Act
(EPA) counterpart. The EPA permits wage discriminations when
based on "any other factor other than sex."'' 37 But the ADEA
does not permit just any other-than-age factor, but rather only
reasonableother-than-age factors. Indeed, it could be argued that
by this language the ADEA explicitly adopts a disparate impact
concept of business necessity by applying a test of reasonableness to factors that are not age-based in the intent sense.' 38
A second argument against the disparate impact concept
under the ADEA is more result-oriented. Impact is a necessary
theory of discrimination under Title VII because of the pervasiveness of discrimination against minorities; to merely require
policies and practices to be neutral, in the sense of lacking any
discriminatory intent, would still leave minorities frozen into
subordinate positions in the workforce. From this perception
two implications emerge. First, it is claimed that discrimination
against older workers is less invidious, less systematic, and less
pervasive than race or gender discrimination and therefore does
not warrant the radical step of adopting a disparate impact
test. 3 9 Second, the adoption of such a test under the ADEA
135 See Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STANFORD L.
REV. 837, 844-845 (1982).
136 A comparable question is addressed in connection with the Equal Pay Act. See
generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at § 17.12.
137 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1978).
138 A contrary argument can be drawn from the structure of the defense: "it shall
not be unlawful ...to take any action otherwise prohibited.., where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." If disparate impact discrimination is not "otherwise prohibited" by the ADEA, the defense cannot make it so.
The rebuttal to this argument, of course, is that disparate impact age discrimination
is illegal and that the reasonable factors defense is simply a statutory expression of
the business necessity defense.
139 The argument admits that there is considerable discrimination against older
workers, particularly with respect to new hiring; it stresses, however, that there is
also considerable discrimination in favor of older workers, especially in job security
and pay as a result of seniority. Further, unlike minority groups who were never
the beneficiaries of any kind of discrimination, older workers were once younger
and may have benefitted from age discriminations. These kinds of considerations
led the Supreme Court to refuse to treat discriminations on account of age as sus-
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would in fact work at cross-purposes with the more fundamental
concerns of Title VII. That is, by protecting an older workforce
(which is statistically "whiter" and more "male") the ADEA will
act to retard the advancement of minorities and women, which is
the goal of Title VII. 4 °
A third argument against disparate impact under the ADEA
is simply that the theory is fundamentally misconceived in this
context. Under this view Griggs is correctly founded on the premise that
[t]here is nothing inherent in race that supports a correlation
between race and ability to perform a particular skill. Instead,
the source of the correlation must be found in factors such as
past discrimination and cultural deprivation. But, unlike race,
there is an inherent correlation between age and ability.' 4 '
The point apparently is that certain policies and practices may disparately affect older workers because, as a group, older workers are
less qualified than younger workers for many positions because of
the physical, and perhaps mental, deteriorations caused by age.
Under this view, disparate treatment should be proscribed because
individuals ought to be judged on their own merits, even if the
group to which they belong is characterized by certain declines in
ability. But disparate impact analysis would be self-defeating because normal merit-based policies will have such an impact on older
workers or at least some subsets of them.
Even if the basic premise of a decline in ability is accepted, it is
not clear why the disparate impact theory is inappropriate. In those
cases where age leads to lesser performance on a certain criterion
for older workers than younger ones (or at least for certain age
groups of older workers), there will be a disparate impact on age
grounds but the employer should be able to justify its practice by
business necessity. It is only where there is a disparate impact on
older workers that is not justifiable that the impact theory will result
in liability.
Perhaps because of this welter of arguments, the case law under
the ADEA is less than definitive about the applicability of the disparate impact theory. In part this is because relatively few cases have
pect or quasi-suspect under equal protection analysis. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
140 See Blumrosen, Book Review, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 186, 192-193 (1981).
141 See Note, supra note 135. To demonstrate that Congress recognized such a
correlation, this piece cites the bfoq defense and the fact that the ADEA permitted
mandatory retirement at 70. The 1986 amendments eliminating the upper age
limit obviously undercut this argument.
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considered disparate impact questions, plaintiffs having usually relied on the disparate treatment approach.' 4 2 Also, in a number of
instances plaintiffs have inexplicably failed to raise the disparate impact theory even though it appeared potentially applicable. For example, in Holley v. Sanyo Mfg. Inc.,143 the appeals court rejected a
claim of age discrimination without analyzing a possible disparate
impact theory. The plaintiff offered proof that his heart condition
adversely affected his employer's evaluation of him. The court
quoted Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 14 4 as holding that "the age statute was
not meant to prohibit employment decisions based on factors that
sometimes accompany advancing age, such as declining health or
diminished vigor or competence."' 145 While that statement is accurate so far as it goes, neither Holley nor Loeb considered whether the
disparate impact theory would at the least require the employer to
justify a particular health policy as business necessity if it in fact had
a disparate impact. But in neither case did the plaintiff make a
showing of the kind of disparity of impact that would require such a
showing.
When plaintiffs have directly invoked the disparate impact theory under the ADEA, however, the appellate courts have unanimously applied it. 14 6 Perhaps the leading case is Geller v.
Markham, 147 decided by the Second Circuit. Certiorari was denied
by the Supreme Court over a strong dissent by Justice Rehnquist
4
who objected to the use of disparate impact under the ADEA.1 1
Geller held that a school board policy restricting new employment to
teachers with less than five years' experience was illegal. The court
of appeals held that disparate impact was established by plaintiff's
evidence that more than ninety percent of teachers over 40 were
disqualified by such a rule, compared with only sixty-two percent of
those under 40. The court further rejected as a justification the financial business necessity urged by the school board-that statemandated salary scales required paying more experienced teachers
higher salaries.
A second ADEA case adopting disparate impact analysis is
142 A number of decisions involve facially unequal treatment, and the only real
issue is whether any of the statutory exceptions applies. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
143 771 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1985).
144 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).

145

Id. at 1016.

See generally Player, DisparateImpact Analysis and the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1038 (1984).
147 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
148 See Markham, 451 U.S. at 945-49.
146
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Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College,' 4 9 which involved the transfer of
a former city college to the Missouri state college system. The
board of regents set a low quota of tenured positions at the "new"
college, and allowed persons who had held tenured positions at the
"old" college to compete only for the tenured slots at the new college. The Eighth Circuit held that this policy, because of its impact
on an older, tenured group, had a disparate impact that was unjustified by the attempted business necessity defenses of cost-cutting and
maintaining quality. The former was, as a matter of law, insufficient,
and the latter not proven.
Geller and Leftwich and other circuit court cases employing disparate impact analysis under the ADEA 15 ° have generally assumed
the applicability of that analysis without discussing it in any detail.' 5 ' Nevertheless, while the question cannot be viewed as definitively resolved, the acceptance of the theory by the circuits
considering it suggests that the more important questions lie in the
application of that theory to ADEA situations. As in other Age Act
contexts, the more developed Title VII law should be examined, but
several points peculiar to the ADEA must be addressed.
First, Geller found the central fact of disparity of impact by comparing the effects of the policy on the group of older workers (then
40 to 70) and younger workers (below 40). Perhaps in accordance
with this logic, another decision indicated that it would not be sufficient to establish a general adverse impact on older workers as compared to younger ones-the plaintiff would have to show the impact
on the protected group.' 5 2
Age-unlike sex and race-is, however, a continuum. This
means that there can be a question as to age discrimination among
subgroups of the over-40 cohort. For example, suppose a plaintiff
proved a disparity of impact on an over-55 group as compared with
either younger workers below 40 or younger workers below 55.
Would this constitute a prima facie case? Would it matter, if true,
that there was no disparity of impact on the entire 40-and-over cohort (as compared to the entire below-40 group)? The purposes of
149 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).

150 See Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Bordens,
Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984); Allison v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 680
F.2d 1318 (11 th Cir. 1982). See also Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d
111 (3d Cir. 1983) (assuming arguendo that the disparate impact theory applied,
the court found no such impact.)
151 But see Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 122 (raising but not deciding whether disparate
impact theory applied).
152 But see id. at 129-131 (dissent of Judge Sloviter).
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the statute would seem to support disparate impact analysis to the
extent that any appreciable group of older workers is affected relative to younger workers, but the practicalities of the situation should
prevent a narrow focus on, say, an age group as small as one year.
Second, the Leftwich decision found a disparate impact by proof
that the mean age of the tenured faculty at the old college was
nearly 46, while that of the nontenured faculty was 34. This, of
course, would not establish the disparate impact of a policy reserving certain slots as tenured and nontenured. Such an impact would
result only if the ratio of tenured to nontenured slots favored the
nontenured faculty who were presumably younger. While the
court's opinion is not specific, this appeared to be the case, although
some doubt is cast on this conclusion because of the defendant's
proof that the average age of the new college's faculty was virtually
the same as that of the old college.' 5 3
Third, assuming a disparity of impact is shown, the question
arises of what defenses are available. As with Title VII, a seniority
system is a statutory defense. Similarly, there is an ADEA defense
for "reasonable factors other than age." While these are treated in
more detail, subsequently, it seems clear that an employer may be
able to escape liability if either defense is established despite any
disparity of impact. More broadly, if Title VII principles are applied, an employer will be able to justify a policy with a disparate
impact by showing business necessity. Both Geller and Lefiwich rejected the argument that cost-cutting is a valid business necessity. It
is true that such a defense will not suffice to save a disparate treatment case,154 but it is not so clear that that should be true of disparate impact. For example, suppose an employer, in a period of
retrenchment, discharges several workers, all of whom are highly
paid and all of whom are older. The situation is ambiguous. The
employer might be discriminating intentionally on account of age.
In that case, as with Title VII, the fact that the employer has some
153 The Leftwich court itself rejected this proof in part because it viewed it as a
"bottom line" defense, which had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10,
at § 4.2.1.2. But it is not so clear that the defense argument, as in Teal, was that
other factors compensated for the discriminatory impact of a selection device;
rather, the defense might have been pointing to these statistics to demonstrate that
the policy in question had no disparate impact.
154 See Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). The Leftwich court
cited EEOC and Department of Labor views on this point: 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f)
(1986), and 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1986), but both address disparate treatment
discrimination.
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economic justification should be irrelevant. 155
Suppose, however, that the finder of fact concludes that the employer did not take age into account at all, but simply discharged a
large group of his highest-paid employees. To make the point clear,
suppose the group discharged, while predominately composed of
older workers, included several highly paid younger employees. It
would seem that the disparate impact theory would apply, and that
the employer would have a superficially plausible business necessity
defense.
But further analysis is necessary. While reducing labor costs is
a legitimate business objective, it does not follow that any method of
doing so is permissible. Specifically, the elimination of higher-paid
employees who tend to be older may be objectionable under the
ADEA if it is not the result of an employer calculus that takes both
costs and benefits into account. That is, an employer should consider the productivity of the employees to be discharged, not merely
56
their salaries. 1
But that will not necessarily avoid a disparate impact on older
workers: if their higher salaries are largely the result of seniority
rather than ability, one could still expect that a cost-benefit analysis
would tend to eliminate older, more senior workers. 1 57 Such a result still seems objectionable because it is not the work that the employees are doing that causes their discharge, but rather their high
salaries relative to younger, less senior employees. While cost-cutting remains a legitimate employer goal, from a business necessity
perspective it does not follow that discharging higher-paid workers
is a necessary means to achieve that end.'15 Put simply, there will
normally be a less restrictive alternative. In Lefiwich, for example,
there seemed to be no consideration of reducing costs by generally
155 To the extent that cost is relevant to disparate treatment under the ADEA, it
is under the bona fide benefit plan exception, discussed infra. Indeed, the need for
a statutory exception to permit cost-based distinctions in benefit plans has been
argued to demonstrate congressional intent that cost considerations are not otherwise a defense to age discrimination. See Note, The Cost Defense Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 580.
156 Id. at 584-585. See also Metz, 828 F.2d at 1216-1222 (dissent of Judge
Easterbrook).
157 Note, supra note 155, at 599-600. A plaintiff cannot prevail on this theory,
however, without a showing that this impact in fact occurred. See Holt v. Gamewell
Corp., 797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986).
158 In Leftwich itself, the court rejected the defendants' claim that the selection
plan was designed to "promote innovation and quality among the faculty" in part
because there was no proof that the plan with the disparate impact was necessary to
achieve that goal.
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cutting salaries.' 5 9 Alternatively, the older worker could be offered
the choice of continuing at a reduced salary. While there are understandable reasons why an employer might hesitate to do this-the
older worker may well have a continuing "gripe" that will interfere
with his job performance-it is not clear that such reasons rise to
the level of a business necessity.
In this regard, consider the problem suggested by Holley v.
Sanyo Mfg. Inc. 160 The plaintiff there claimed that the employer
wished to replace him with a younger person because, as an older
worker with greater experience, he was making a much higher salary. The Holley court avoided analyzing this claim under disparate
impact, but the theory seems applicable if the plaintiff can demonstrate that a policy to this effect exists.' 6 '
VI.

STATUTORY DEFENSES AND EXCEPTIONS

The significance of the theories of liability under the statute
is obviously affected by the several statutory defenses available to
defend against an ADEA action. These include the bona fide occupational qualifications (bfoq), employee benefit plans, bona
fide seniority systems, good cause, and reasonable factors other
than age. These, and others, will be discussed in the following
sections.
A.

Bona Fide Occupational Qualification

Like Title VII, the ADEA contains an exception "where age
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business."'' 62 The age
bfoq generated a large number of decisions prior to the 1986
amendments removing the age 70 upper limitation on statutory
protection. While most of those bfoq decisions involved police
officers or fire fighters, employment that is now temporarily exempt from ADEA coverage, the 1986 elimination of any upper
limit on the protected age group seems certain to lead many employers to attempt to justify continuing mandatory retirement
policies under the bfoq defense.
A defendant may establish age as a bfoq by meeting several
159 In Geller, the situation was somewhat different: since the state mandated certain salaries based on experience, arguably the only way the defendant school
board could reduce salary costs was by restricting the experience of teachers hired.
160 771 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1985).
161 See Dace v. ACF Indus., 722 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1983).
162 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), § (4)(f)(1) (1985).
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requirements. First, the employer must show that being younger
than a certain age is essential to the employer's business. Second, the employer must demonstrate either that it had a factual
basis for believing (1) that no persons over a certain age are able
to perform the work in question or (2) that the group of older
workers is less capable of performing the work and that it is impossible or highly impracticable for the employer to make individual determinations as to qualifications. The employer has the
burden of persuasion as to the existence of an age bfoq. 163 In
short, while there is reason to expect a substantial increase in age
bfoq litigation in the wake of the elimination of the age-70 upper
limit in ADEA protection, the employer faces a difficult task in
establishing this exception.
B.

Bona Fide Employee Benefit Plans

Another defense which may be raised by an employer to
avoid liability is by establishing that discrimination resulted from
a bona fide employee benefit plan. Section 623(f) of the ADEA
provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or labor organization... to observe the terms of .. .any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or
insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this [Act], except that no such employee benefit plan
shall excuse the failure to hire any individual and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary
retirement of any individual[aged40 or more] because of the age of such
individual.164
The burden of persuasion as to this exception is on the defendant
seeking to immunize conduct that is otherwise illegal under the
Act.

1 65

In United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann,166 the Supreme Court construed an earlier version of this provision that did not include the
italicized language. The Court held that involuntary retirement
See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2), § 4(0(2) (1985) (emphasis added). The italicized language was added by the 1978 amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-256. Although this
exception does not by its terms govern federal employment, which is treated in a
separate provision of the statute, it has been held to apply to federal retirement
plans. Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1977).
165 EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 820 (1984); Crosland v. Charlotte Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 686 F.2d 208
163
164

(4th Cir. 1982).
166 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
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prior to age 65 (then the upper age limit of ADEA protection) was
permitted if it was part of an employee benefit plan. 16 7 Scarcely had
the Supreme Court's decision been rendered, however, before Congress, in the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, added the italicized
language providing that involuntary retirement was not permitted
pursuant to this provision. 6 ' Since those amendments simultaneously extended the upper limits of the ADEA to 70, and Congress
has subsequently removed the upper age limit entirely for almost all
covered employment, the effect is to render all involuntary retirement illegal, even if pursuant to a retirement plan, unless justified as
a bfoq.

16 9

Despite this legislative narrowing of the bona fide retirement
plan exception, there remain important questions about the scope
of the provision, questions that were complicated by the inability of
the Department of Labor and the EEOC to develop definitive regulations on the subject 170 and by the difficulties of determining
167 The Supreme Court majority rejected plaintiff's argument that the sole purpose of the retirement plan exception was to remove disincentives to hiring older
workers by permitting the employer to provide them with fewer benefits than
younger workers. Although recognizing that this was one purpose, the Court read
the exception more broadly to reach involuntary retirement. This interpretation
was found consistent with the general congressional proscription of arbitrary age
discrimination because, unlike discharge without pay, retirement on an adequate
pension was viewed favorably by Congress. Id. at 198-199. The Court's opinion
concluded by stressing that the plan in question could scarcely be a subterfuge
since a plan established 26 years prior to the passage of the ADEA cannot qualify as
a "scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion." Id. at 203.
Mr. Justice White, while concurring, disagreed that an otherwise bona fide plan
was necessarily lawful merely because it was adopted long before the Act: defendant's decision to continue the plan after the effective date of the ADEA "must be
separately examined to determine whether it is proscribed by the Act," id. at 205,
because the statute applied to "new and existing employee benefit plans, and to
both the establishment and maintenance of such plans."
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, and this dissent became the basis of
the 1978 amendment expressly barring mandatory retirement before the then-established upper age limit of 70.
168 Conference Report 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., makes explicit that this
amendment was intended to overrule McMann.
169 The extension of the ADEA's upper limit to 70 became effective on January 1,
1979, but the prohibition on involuntary retirement under a benefit plan generally
became effective earlier-on April 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(b). The removal of the upper age limit entirely became generally effective onJanuary 1, 1987.
The 1978 amendment has been held not to be retroactive. Smart v. Porter Paint
Co., 630 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1980);Jensen v. Gulf Oil Refining & Mkt. Co., 623 F.2d
406 (5th Cir. 1980); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1980). But
see EEOC Interpretive Rules, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(b) (1985). It seems clear that the
1986 amendments will also be prospective.
170 The Department of Labor, which was originally in charge of ADEA enforcement, issued an Interpretive Bulletin that addressed a number of issues, including
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whether previous judicial decisions, including McMann itself, have
been wholly superseded by the 1978 amendments, or whether they
continue to have some vitality.
The basic question is, of course, when benefit plans may-short
of "excus[ing] the failure to hire any individual" or "requiring or
permitting the involuntary retirement 'ofany individual,"-discriminate on the basis of age. The existence of the exception obviously
contemplates that some such discriminations are permissible, but
gives little guidance on which ones fall outside the pale.
In order to approach the question of what discriminations are
permissible under this exception, it is perhaps best to start with the
words of the exception: it is not illegal "to observe the terms of...
any bona fide benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes" of the
ADEA. The following treatment is organized around the four concepts embraced in this language: what is a benefit plan, what conduct "observes" such a plan, what makes a plan "bona fide," and
what constitutes "a subterfuge."
1.

Benefit plan

In deciding that constitutes a benefit plan that may qualify
under the statutory exception, there are a number of major concerns. First, one must distinguish between "benefits" and other
aspects of employment, such as compensation. Although the
term "fringe benefit" is not one of art, clearly Congress was concerned with plans "such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan" rather than employer systems dealing with base compensation or other privileges of employment. 171
Second, even within the universe of fringe benefits it has
been held that, in order for the exception to apply, the plan must
deal with benefits whose costs are related to age. This position is
benefit plans. 29 C.F.R. § 860.1 et seq. (1986). The EEOC, after it assumed enforcement responsibilities, issued its own Interpretive Rules, which were in some
respects different from the Bulletin. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.1 et seq. (1986). However,
while the EEOC rules generally replaced the Bulletin, which was for the most part
rescinded, the Commission neither adopted nor rejected the Labor Department's
views concerning benefit plans. See EEOC Interpretive Rules, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.10. Accordingly, those Interpretations presumably remained in effect.
They are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 860.120. A law suit compelled the EEOC to finally
rescind the Interpretive Bulletin but was unsuccessful in its attempt to require the
Commission to adopt new rules for such plans. See American Ass'n of Retired Persons v. EEOC, 823 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
171 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1) and (b).
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taken by the applicable regulations,17 2 and EEOC v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. 173 illustrates the point. In that case, the Third Circuit
considered a benefit plan defense by an employer that denied
certain unemployment benefits to workers over the age of 55
when a layoff occurred; the employer sought to justify the denial
of these benefits on the ground that the older workers were eligible for early retirement. After rejecting the "other than age" defense,' 74 the court turned to the district court's conclusion that
the plan was valid under § 4(f)(2) because it constituted insurance against unemployment. While not disagreeing with that
characterization, the Third Circuit found that that was not
enough to establish a statutory "benefit plan." Rather, "[t]he
thread common to [exclude] retirement, insurance and pension
plans . . . is the age-related cost factor."' 7 5 In short, the court
believed that Congress intended to allow employers some latitude in discriminating against older employees in the award of
when age was related to increased costs of such benebenefits
76
fits.'

Accordingly, the court found the exclusion not to be a

bona fide benefit plan and therefore it did not have to be analyzed to see if it was a subterfuge.
Finally, there may be a focus on the "plan" concept: a
scheme that was a one-time, ad hoc arrangement has been held
not the kind of on-going plan that Congress intended. 77 Nevertheless, the courts have not imposed formal requirements for
such a plan. In one case, the Fifth Circuit rejected arguments
that material provisions of a qualified plan must be communicated to employees and that the plan must comply with Internal
Revenue definitions. 178
172

29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1).

173 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983).
174 Id. at 222-223.
175 Id. at 224.

Accord, EEOC v. Bordens, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984). This view
draws support from McMann, where at least eight justices accepted the proposition
that newly hired older employees may be treated less favorably than comparable
younger employees with regard to employment benefits, although no employer
may refuse to hire someone because he cannot participate in a benefit plan or because participation would be too costly. While not necessarily rejecting this principle per se, other cases have taken a more permissive view of what constitutes agerelated cost savings. Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986).
177 See Bordens, Inc., 724 F.2d at 1396.
178 Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). See also 29
C.F.R. § 860.120(b). But see Sexton v. Beatrice Foods Co., 630 F.2d 478 (7th Cir.
1980); Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and Recent Developments, 13 DUQUESNE L. REV. 227, 245-246 (1974).
176
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2,. To observe
The second requirement of the exception is simply that any
benefits at issue be denied or reduced "pursuant to" the plan;
thus, courts have rejected attempted defenses when the benefits
in question were denied wholly apart from the plan, 179 or when
the plan was invoked to justify discrimination against employees
who were not members of the plan. i8 ° This follows from the fact
that any denial of benefits must be "to observe the terms of" the
plan.

18

3.

Bona fide

The "bona fide" concept is central to construing the extent
of the exception,1 2 but is not one whose meaning is readily apparent.18 3 The mere fact that a plan discriminates on the basis of
179 Alford v. City of Lubbock, Texas, 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1982) (denying sick
leave to employees not covered by the retirement plan was not part of the plan);
EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975
(1982).
180 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(b). See Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co.,
329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971).
181 That is, the denial must not merely be made in the context of the plan in
order to qualify as an action that is "to observe the terms" of a bona fide plan. See
Sexton, 630 F.2d at 488 (involuntary retirement of employee at 59 was not pursuant
to plan that provided for involuntary retirement at 65 but only for voluntary retirement earlier). See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(c). Accord, EEOC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
632 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1981); Benzel v. Valley
Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 633 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1980).
182 There were a number of cases decided under the pre-1978 version of the
ADEA that state that a bona fide plan must pay substantial benefits. Indeed, McMann seemed to suggest this proposition by stressing that Congress envisioned a
trade-off between involuntary retirement and pension benefits. Quoting from a
prior case, the Court noted that "[w]hile discharge without compensation is obviously undesirable, retirement on an adequate pension is generally regarded with
favor." McMann, 434 U.S. at 198. This logic suggests that a plan that pays no
benefits is not bona fide; further, perhaps nominal or even real, but plainly inade-.
quate, benefits may not be enough. Justice White's concurring opinion in McMann
indicated that Congress intended to except all plans "as long as the benefits they
pay are not so unreasonably small as to make the 'retirements' nothing short of
discharge." Id. at 207. While other cases have repeated this caution, e.g., EEOC v.
Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1982); Benzel v. Valley National Bank of
Calif., 633 F.2d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 1980); Smart v. Porter Paint Co., 630 F.2d
490, 494 (7th Cir. 1980), it seems doubtful that this requirement is of any consequence now that mandatory retirement by virtue of such plans is prohibited.
183 Some courts have looked for an analogy to the bona fide seniority system
exception in Title VII. See Alford v. City of Lubbock, Texas, 664 F.2d 1263, 1271
(5th Cir. 1982). Not only is the language of the two exceptions somewhat different,
but the cases under Title VII make clear that a seniority system is bona fide if it is
not the result of intentional discrimination. If that analogy is used, any retirement
plan that facially discriminates on account of age would be illegal under the ADEA,
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age by providing fewer benefits for older workers8 4 does not, of
course, prevent it from being bona fide, because Congress be18 5
lieved that certain discriminations in benefits were justified.
On the other hand, the requirement of bona fideness (and the
prohibition of subterfuges) obviously limits the extent of the discriminations permitted. The difficulty lies in developing a test to
distinguish permitted discriminations from impermissible ones.
In fact, there seem to be two distinct, if related, rationales
underlying the entire exception, both of which stem from a congressional recognition that certain costs tend to increase for
older workers who, as a group, are more subject to illness, longterm disability, and even death than are younger employees. 1 6
The first rationale is that, due to this reality, to require equal
treatment for older workers in terms of benefits would require
employers to incur greater costs and therefore discourage hiring
or retention of older workers, regardless of the nondiscrimination commands of the ADEA. The second rationale is simply
that, from a fairness perspective, employers should not have
as would a seniority system under Title VII that explicitly provided that blacks had
less seniority credit than whites with equal service. In fact, under the ADEA itself,
the Supreme Court has recognized that a seniority system that has an explicit age
classification is not bona fide. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 124-125. But since Congress
seemed clearly to intend age-based distinctions benefits, "bona fide" in the context
of the benefit plan exception must have a different meaning.
184 This seems to be the major thrust of the exception, but it would also seem to
permit greater benefits being paid to older workers. This latter aspect could exonerate preferences for older workers, such as sliding-scale retirement provisions that
permit retirement on specified benefits with fewer years of service as age increases.
185 See generally Cohen, Section 4(f)(2) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Age
Discrimination in Employee Benefit Plans, 2 WEST. NEw ENG. L. REV. 379 (1980).
186 See McMann, 434 U.S. at 200. In the House, at least two representatives objected to the bill insofar as they interpreted it to allow total exclusion of newly hired
older workers from benefit plans. 113 Cong. Rec. 34745 (STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SMITH (D-IOWA)) AND 113 CONG. REC. 34750 (statement of Representative
Randall (D-Mo.)). But in the Senate, Senator Javits (R-N.Y.) spoke of the act as
allowing employers not to pay "exactly the same benefits," 113 Cong. Rec. S31255
and Senator Yarborough described it as limiting a new employee's "right to obtain
full consideration." Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the remarks of Senator Javits
seem to envision an "equal cost" approach to benefits:
[A] retirement, pension or assurance plan will be considered in compliance with the statute where the actual amount of the payment made or
cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is equal to that made or incurred on behalf of a younger worker, even though the older worker
may thereby receive a lesser amount of pension or retirement benefits,
or insurance coverage.
123 Cong. Rec. S17274 (1977).
Other remarks are supportive of this view. 123 Cong. Rec. S17274 (remarks of
Senator Williams (D-N.J.)).
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these additional costs imposed on them." 7
One straightforward approach to the exception would look
to these reasons and simply recognize as bona fide those plans
that reduce benefits in order to eliminate such excess costs. In
fact, precisely that principle has ultimately emerged, as the result
of new congressional action.'I" This legislative action,, however,
was not effective until January 1, 1988,,19 thus requiring some
brief discussion of the problems that prompted this amendment.
The administrative interpretations of the benefit plan exceptions adopted an "equal cost" approach with respect to all benefit plans except retirementplans. The rationale for the general rule
was simply that eliminating disincentives for hiring or retaining
of older workers and fairness to employers were satisfied if older
workers' benefits were of equivalent cost to the employers, even
if the benefits received were proportionately lower. Thus, the
Department of Labor's Interpretive Bulletin, which was in this
regard not superseded by the new EEOC Interpretive Rules,
specified that all nonretirement benefit plans had to provide
equal benefits to older and younger workers or reflect unequal
benefits that were cost-justified.' 90 This means that any lower
level of benefits for older workers would reflect only the increased costs of providing benefits to such older workers.' 9 ' Put
another way, if the costs incurred are approximately equal, the
fact that an older worker receives less than a younger counterpart
187 E.g. Crosland v. Charlotte Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 686 F.2d 208 (4th Cir.
1982).
188 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9201 of
which amends 29 U.S.C. § 623 by adding a new paragraph (i).
189 Id., § 9204.
190 See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120. The original Interpretive Bulletin provided little
guidance on the implementation of the equal-cost concept. In the wake of the 1978
amendment, however, the Department of Labor substantially elaborated on the requirements for reductions in employee benefits linked to age.
191 Application of the equal-cost concept in practice is not easy. The Department
of Labor's regulations are elaborate. For example, they permit two separate ways
of viewing such costs-benefit by benefit, or the benefit package approach-which
allows all fringe benefits (except retirement plans) to be lumped together. Cost
comparison had to be based on the employer's own cost experience or that of a
group of similarly situated employers. Further, in order to compare the costs of
benefits to older workers vis-a-vis younger ones, the employer was generally permitted to make cost comparisons in age brackets of up to five years. That is, there
is cost justification if, for a given level of benefits, the average cost per bracket is
equal to the average cost for the immediately younger bracket. 29 C.F.R. §
860.120(d)(3).
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under a benefit plan does not matter.192
The Bulletin, however, essentially adopted a bifurcated
scheme. While all benefits except retirement benefits are subject
to an equal-cost rule, the Bulletin did not require equal costs
where retirement plans are concerned. The reason for not
adopting an equal-cost rule for retirement plans emerges from
the legislative history of the 1978 amendments, which manifests a
congressional concern with permitting employers to establish a
normal retirement age (NRA) for purposes of "defined benefit"
pension plans. Thus, there are aspects of the legislative history
which state that it was permissible to deny the accrual of benefits
between the NRA (usually 65) and the then-applicable upper age
limit of 70.
The explanation for this concession to employers lay in the
very concept of a defined benefit plan. In such a plan (in contrast
to a defined contribution plan), the employer provides funds sufficient to provide a defined level of benefits at retirement age.
Because a defined benefit plan must of necessity compute benefits on the basis of a presumed retirement date, employers using
such plans were required by ERISA,' 93 the federal law governing
pension plans, to establish a "normal retirement age.Before the 1978 amendments, normal retirement age was
frequently also the age of mandatory retirement-then permitted
to be 65. When Congress passed the amendments, it barred
mandatory retirement before 70, but the legislative history
showed some intent to leave intact the NRA concept: denial of
accrual of plan benefits between the normal retirement age and
age 70 was said not to violate either the ADEA or ERISA.' 94
Obviously, this arrangement resulted in discrimination
against post-NRA workers because, unlike younger workers, their
subsequent years of employment yielded them no further retirement benefits. Further, this scheme is not related to cost: the
employer makes no further contributions at all after NRA and, as
far as retirement plans are concerned, therefore actually incurs
192 The Interpretive Bulletin contains elaborate provisions for comparing costs
for purposes of this analysis.
193 ERISA is the acronym for the Employment Retirement Income Security Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1381 (1985).
194 S. Rep. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 14-16 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 504. See also 124 Cong. Rec. 4451 (March 23,
1978) (statement of Sen. Williams). See generally Gitt, The 1978 Amendments to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act-A Legal Overview, 64 MARQUETrE L. REV. 607
(1981).
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lower costs for post-NRA workers.' 9 5 This disparate treatment
could be justified only as deriving from a perceived congressional
purpose-not to affect such pension plans.
While the validity of the regulations and their interpretation
of congressional intent generated considerable confusion, no extended treatment of this issue seems necessary in light of the
congressional action taken to eliminate the anomaly of allowing
employers to discriminate against older workers by wholly excluding them from further participation in retirement plans after
NRA.
Basically, Congress acted by adding to the ADEA a new provision, effective January 1, 1988, which makes it unlawful "to establish or maintain an employee pension benefit plan which
requires or permits" any age-based reduction in employee benefit accrual (for defined benefit plans) or any age-based reduction
in allocations to the employer's account (for defined contribution
plans). 19 6 The effect of this amendment is generally to bring the
treatment of retirement plans under the benefit plans exception
into conformity with the general equal-cost rule adopted by the
applicable regulations. While substantial development of this
amendment by administrative regulation is to be anticipated, it is
at least clear that Congress has removed a major disincentive for
older workers to continue employment after the traditional retirement age of 65, which was the typical normal retirement age
at which continued accrual of pension benefits was cut off under
9 7
prior law. 1
But if all benefits are to be subjected to an "equal cost" test,
the contours of this principle remain to be developed. In the few
cases to consider this question, the courts have not required any
strict tailoring of plans to cost savings-it seems to suffice for
"bona fide" purposes if there is some relationship between the
benefit plan and the cost savings.' 9 However, the relationship
between the plans' premises and the cost savings to be realized
195 Indeed, at least for defined benefit plans, there is reason to believe that continued participation after age 65 would generally result in no cost to employers
because of the shortened life expectancy of workers retiring later. See Cong. Rec.
H13045 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1986) (statement of Rep. Grossley).
196 See supra note 188. The new paragraph permits benefits plans to limit the
amount of benefits by number of years of service or years of plan participation, as
long as the limitation operates "without regard to age." (i)(2).
197 Crosland v. Charlotte Ear, Eye & Throat Hosp., 686 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1982).
198 Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986).
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has become the focus of the "subterfuge" prong of the benefit
plan exception.
4.

Subterfuge

A benefit plan that otherwise meets the requirements of
§ 623(f) will still fail to qualify under the statutory exception if "it
is a subterfuge to evade the purposes" of the ADEA. It is not
clear, however, how a plan that adopts an equal-cost approach
for older workers could ever be a subterfuge. While such a plan
does discriminate on account of age, it does so in apparent compliance with a congressional perception that employers ought not
to be required to bear higher costs associated with providing
equal benefits of older workers.
In one case, after assuming the bona fides of the plan, the
Fourth Circuit considered what factors would invalidate the plan
as a subterfuge.' 9 9 Drawing on McMann, the court formulated
the test for rebutting this possibility as follows: "[t]his may be
done by [the defendant's] proving that the provision was motivated by a legitimate business or economic purposes which, objectively assessed, reasonably justified it. "200 The plaintiff,
however, could presumably attempt to show that the business
purpose was in fact pretext. The decision is likely to turn on
whether the plaintiff can show that the plan so radically departs
from reasonably anticipated cost savings that it could not have
been motivated by those savings.20 '
C. Bona Fide Seniority Systems
The ADEA provides that "[i]t shall not be unlawful for an
employer, employment agency, or labor organization to observe
the terms of a bona fide seniority system.

' 20 2

The 1978 amend-

ments added language to this provision specifying that seniority
systems may not "require or permit" involuntary retirement.20 3
Since seniority systems will normally favor older workers, there is
little cause to interpret this defense. Nevertheless, seniority sys199 Crosland, 686 F.2d at 212 n.3.
Id. at 213. Crosland was decided prior to the addition of paragraph (i) to
§ 623, establishing that accrual of retirement benefits could not be cut off at normal
retirement age.
201 See Cipriano, 785 F.2d at 58-59. See also Portenze. New York Shipping Ass'n,
804 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1955 (1987).
202 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2), § 4(0(2) (1985).
203 Id.
200
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tems can become implicated in ADEA cases involving discrimination claims among groups within the protected class.
In Thurston,2 ° 4 the Supreme Court made clear that the seniority exception could not be utilized to shield intentional discrimination because of age. In that case, the defendant treated
captains who were disqualified by an FAA rule from piloting
commercial aircraft at age 60 differently from captains disqualified for other reasons. This was held to be age discrimination on
its face, and therefore, prima facie illegal. After disposing of the
proffered bfoq defense, the Court proceeded to give short shrift
to a claim that the seniority system exception shielded the
practice:
[A]ny seniority system that includes the challenged practice is
not "bona fide" under the statute. The Act provides that a
seniority system may not "require or permit" the involuntary
retirement of a protected individual because of his age.
Although the FAA "age 60 rule" may have caused [plaintiff's]
retirement, TWA's seniority plan certainly "permitted" it
within the meaning of the ADEA. Moreover, because captains
disqualified for reasons other than age are allowed to "bump"
less senior flight engineers, the mandatory retirement was agebased. Therefore, the "bona fide
seniority system" defense is
20 5
unavailable to the [employer].
Despite Thurston, seniority systems lacking a specific age limitation
will probably be broadly approved if the law developed under Title
VII is applied in the ADEA context.2 0 6 a result that seems appropriate in view of the many parallels between the two statutes.
In resolving questions under this exception, the EEOC's Interpretive Rules are a useful source of guidance in the absence of apposite ADEA precedents. Generally speaking, these rules require
that seniority systems 2 ° 7 must be "based on length of service as the
primary criterion for the equitable allocation of available employment opportunities and prerogatives," although merit may be a factor.20 8 Such systems must also be communicated to employees and
must be applied uniformly, regardless of age. 20 9 Further, since sen469 U.S. 111 (1985). See also supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
Thurston, 469 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
See Morelock v. National Cash Register Corp., 586 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
207 As under Title VII, there is an unresolved question whether the exemption
covers any seniority system or only those created by collective bargaining agreements. See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at § 4.6.
208 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8 (1986).
209 Id. at § 1625.8(c).
204
205
206
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iority systems normally discriminate in favor of those with longer
service, a system that fails to do so may, "depending on the circumstances," be considered a subterfuge under the Act.21 ° Moreover,
the rules view any seniority systems that are illegal under Title VII
as subject to close scrutiny to ensure they are bona fide under the
ADEA. 2 l ' While one might wonder whether another statute's
prohibitions should be relevant to the ADEA, the question does not
seem worth pursuing in view of the Supreme Court's general valida21 2
tion of seniority systems under Title VII.
Finally, it should be noted that the Rules take the position that
the "subterfuge" notion, which is clearly applicable to employee
benefit plans, also applies to the seniority system exception. This
interpretation of the statutory language appears reasonable in view
of the grammatical construction of the provision. Even if the "subterfuge" limitation is applicable, however, the McMann decision,
which exculpates from "subterfuge" status any plans long predating
the Act, would seem also to exonerate many seniority systems. This
leaves only post-Act systems, and, given the Rule's view of what constitutes a bona fide system, the subterfuge concept should rarely
pose an independent problem.
D.

Good Cause and Reasonable Factors Other Than Age

The ADEA provides that "[i]t shall not be unlawful for an
employer, employment agency, or labor organization. . . (3) to
discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good
cause. ' '213 This provision follows the bfoq exception and the exceptions for bona fide seniority systems or retirement plans.
Those provisions presumably shift to the employer not only the
burden of coming forth with the evidence but also the burden of
persuasion once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.
But it is doubtful that this allocation of burdens is appropriate
with respect to the "good cause" provision.2" 4 The problem is
that "good cause" seems to be the ADEA statutory parallel for
the "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" utilized in Title VII
disparate treatment cases using circumstantial evidence to draw
an inference of intent to discriminate. It would seem likely, then,
that when a plaintiff relies on only the inference-drawing techId. at § 1625.8(b).
Id. at § 1625.8(d).
See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at § 4.6.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f), § 4(f) (1986).
The Supreme Court expressly avoided deciding this question in Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 408 n.10 (1985).
210
211
212
213
214
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nique to establish intent to discriminate, the employer need only
come forward with evidence sufficient to raise a question of fact
that it had good cause for taking the challenged action. The
plaintiff must then prove as pretext any "good cause" put into
evidence by the employer in order to prevail. Where, however,
the plaintiff has established intent to discriminate based on admissions by the defendant, the only question remaining is causation and the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to try to
show that the action was the result of the good cause factor and
not the intent to discriminate.
One factor mentioned in a number of cases is that discharge
for cause under the ADEA does not mean the kind of "good
cause" standard that might be appropriate before tenured or civil
service employees are fired.215 Rather, "the statute is not violated in the case of terminations or other employer decisions
which are premised upon a rational business decision made in
good faith and not actuated by age bias."' 2 16 Whether this interpretation is correct is probably not important: even if "good
cause" was used in the tenure sense, an employer would still be
privileged to terminate employees for other reasons because the
ADEA also declares that it is not unlawful "to take any action
otherwise prohibited.. .where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age."' 2 17 This would seem to be
merely a broader statement of the principle embodied in the
"good cause" section: action against older workers is valid
as
long as it is based on something other than age, subject only to
the requirement that the factor be "reasonable."
The phrasing of the "reasonable factors" provision is similar
to the Equal Pay Act (EPA) insofar as that statute permits unequal pay for equal work between the sexes for one of three specified reasons, or for "any other factor other than sex." ' 21 8 Under

the EPA, the burden of establishing the "other factor" exception
rests on the employer,2 1 9 but it is not clear that the ADEA, which
has been held to generally track Title VII in the proof of discrimi215 See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1045 (1968); Annotation, 66 A.L.R. 3d 1018.
216 Bishop v.JelleffAssocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974). Accord, Brennan v.
Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co.,
320 F.2d 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970). See also Anderson v. Viking Pumo Div., 545 F.2d
1127 (8th Cir. 1976); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 391 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Miss.
1975), aff'd, 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977).
217 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), § 4(f)(1).
218 See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at § 17.14.
219 See generally id.
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nation, should depart from the allocation of burdens in this regard. Like the "good cause" defense, "reasonable factors other
than age" seems to negate the element of discriminatory intent
as to which the plaintiff generally has the burden of persuasion. 22 Despite this reasoning, however, the EEOC's Interpretive Rules place the burden of proving the reasonable-factors
exception under the ADEA Age Act on the employer.22 '
Regardless of the allocations of burdens as to the "good
cause" and the "reasonable factors" exceptions, how are these
defenses made out? The phrasing and the Interpretive Rules
make clear that age must play no part of reasonable factors,222
and presumably this is also true of the "good cause" defense.
The employer cannot, then, admit the age discrimination but
claim some justification, such as economic necessity.2 2 3 In short,

any factor that reflects an intent to discriminate on account of
age cannot establish a defense.
On this ground the courts have held that a state statute mandating a particular discrimination does not constitute a reason220 Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1978).
221 See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.7(e) (1986).
222 29 C.F.R. § 1620.7(c). The old Interpretive Bulletin of the Department of
Labor, although not addressing the "good cause" exception, considered at length
"reasonable factors other than age." Although these interpretations have not been
carried forward in the EEOC's rules, a brief summary may be useful. For a fuller
discussion, see C. Sullivan, M. Zimmer & R. Richards, Federal Statutory Law of
Employment Discrimination (1st ed. 1980), § 11.5. Generally speaking, the Bulletin began by noting that Congress did not intend "to require the employment of
anyone, regardless of age, who is disqualified on ground other than age from performing a particular job." 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c). But, "even in situations where
experience has shown that most elderly persons do not have certain qualifications
which are essential to those who hold certain jobs, some may have them even
though they have attained the age of 60 or 64, and thus discrimination based on
age is forbidden." 29 C.F.R. § 8 6 0.10 3 (g).
Likewise, the Bulletin stated that the higher average cost of employing older
workers rather than younger ones does not justify disparate treatment under the
"reasonable factors" exception, 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h).
The Bulletin recognized several factors that might support a differentiation,
including (1) physical fitness requirements if "reasonably necessary for the specific
work to be performed and . . . uniformly and equally applied to all applicants for
the particular job category, regardless of age;" (2) evaluation factors such as quantity and quality of production, or educational level when "shown to have a valid
relationship to job requirements;" (3) a validated employee test when "specifically
related to the requirements of the job." The Bulletin stated, however, that it "is
considered discriminatory for an employer to specify that he will hire only persons
receiving old age Social Security insurance benefits" because that would discriminate against other individuals within the protected age group.
223 EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984). To the extent, if any,
such a defense might be valid, it would have to be advanced as a bfoq.
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able factor other than age, any more than it does a bfoq.224
Similarly, in one of the first ADEA appellate opinions, Hodgson v.
First FederalSavings & Loan Ass 'n,225 the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant had not established its proffered defense that an older
applicant was not hired because she was overweight. The court
noted not only that the defendant's explanation was weak in light
of direct evidence that age was critical but also that this criterion
would still show age discrimination since younger overweight
people were hired. These cases at least incorporate the disparate
treatment view of discrimination in approaching these defenses.
The older Department of Labor's Interpretive Bulletin, however, was broader because it required that a factor would be
other than age only if it passed scrutiny under both the disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories. For example, if "other
than age" merely referred to the absence of disparate treatment
discrimination, the necessity or validity of physical exams or
other tests would be irrelevant. It would suffice that the requirements were applied uniformly, at least if they were imposed for
nondiscriminatory reasons. The additional requirement of the
Bulletin that such tests be justified as job-related must be derived
from the belief that a policy with disproportionate impact on age
grounds is not an "other than age" policy unless it is justified.2 2 6
An alternative method of reaching a similar result is to focus
on the language of the exception. Unlike the Equal Pay Act,
which validates discriminations based on "any other factor other
than sex," the ADEA excepts only good cause and reasonable factors other than age. Accordingly, the statute may be read as requiring a determination of reasonableness when "other than
age" factors are concerned, and if "reasonable" is to have any
objective meaning, the most obvious yardstick for determining it
is "business necessity" or "job relation."
The cases have not yet clarified the question. In EEOC v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. ,227 the Third Circuit considered an "other
than age" defense offered to an EEOC attack on the denial of
certain unemployment benefits to workers older than age 55 in
224 Johnson v. Mayor and City of Baltimore, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1984); EEOC
v. City of Altoona, 723 F.2d 4 (3d Cir. 1983) (age-related discharge systems linked
to pension eligibility and seniority); EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 705 F.2d 679
(3d Cir. 1983) (age hiring limit).
225 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
226 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
227 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984). See also supra
notes 173-176 and accompanying text (discussion of Westinghouse Elec. Corp.).
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connection with layoffs arising from a plant closing. The employer claimed that the deprivation was triggered not by the employees' ages but rather by their eligibility for early retirement.
The Third Circuit, however, concluded that "early retirement is
too closely related to age to be given credence as a valid justification. 228 It seems likely that the court used the "close relation"
language to indicate a disparate impact analysis, although the relation might be so close that the court was simply saying that intent to discriminate was the appropriate. inference. In any event,
the court felt it necessary to confine the "other than age" defense
so that it did not create a large loophole in the ADEA
prohibitions.2 29
In considering an identical policy in EEOC v. Bordens, Inc. ,23o
the Ninth Circuit was more straightforward. Looking to Norris v.
Arizona Governing Comm. ,231 which had found actuarially-based distinctions between males and females to be illegal under Title VII,
the court stressed that facial discriminations on a prohibited basis
constituted disparate treatment, regardless of subjective motivations or animus. This, of course, is consistent with the Supreme
Court's later analysis in Thurston.232 As for the argument that the
basis of discrimination was retirement status, not age, the Ninth
Circuit held that because age 55 was a requirement for early retirement, age was a but-for cause of the denial of severance pay.
Having found a prima facie violation, the Bordens court held that
factor
the existence of retirement benefits was not a "reasonable
2 33
other than age" for the deprivation of severance pay.
Despite an early case to the contrary, 3 4 it seems clear that
higher labor costs associated with the employment of older employees do not constitute "reasonable factors other than age,"
although at some level such costs might constitute a bfoq. When
the ADEA was passed, there was evidence before Congress that
the employment of older workers typically entitled marginally
228 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d at 222. See also EEOC v. City of Altoona, 723
F.2d 4 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
229 The Westinghouse Elec. court also rejected a bona fide benefit plan defense. See
supra notes 164-171 and accompanying text (discussion of bona fide employee benefit plans).
230 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
231 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
232 See supra notes 31-36 and 204-206 and accompanying text (discussions of
Thurston).
233 Similarly, the court held that the denial of severance pay did not come within
the "bona fide employee benefit plan" exception. Bordens, 463 U.S. at 1395.
234 See Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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higher out-of-pocket costs.235 The legislative choice to proscribe

age discrimination despite this fact would be undercut if courts
were to allow employers to use this factor as a defense in those
situations in which the statistics hold true. In short, such a theory
would generally frustrate the purposes of the ADEA.
A final point to be stressed is that presumably the plaintiff
will have opportunities to surrebut an employer's defense. In the
ADEA context this can be done by proving that the "good cause"
or "reasonable factor" is really a pretext hiding disparate treatment-and perhaps by showing that there is a disparate impact.
While the ADEA cases have not focused on this, the Supreme
Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas v. Green236 in the analogous
Title VII context indicated that when the defendant rebuts by offering a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the
plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating that the reason is a
pretext for discrimination. Since the parallel of this "reason" to
the ADEA "good cause" or "reasonable factor" exception is obvious, the McDonnell Douglas rule should apply under the ADEA
to disparate treatment cases.23 7
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act offers an important tool to attack the continuing problem of discrimination on
account of age. Full effectuation of its purposes, however, requires a detailed appreciation not only of its substantive prohibitions and the theories used to implement them but also of the
significance of the various defenses and exceptions built into the
statutory scheme.
235 Id. at 1317 n.6.
236 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See supra notes 45-98 and accompanying text (discussion
of four-part McDonnell Douglas test).
237 In addition to the defenses and exceptions previously considered, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act has a number of other limitations on its prohibitions which should be noted here. They include: the "bona fide executive" exception, which permits mandatory retirement of certain executives and policy makers
at age 65; the temporary exception for police and firefighters; the temporary exception for tenured professors; the temporary exception for collective bargaining
agreements. For any situation which may fall under these provisions, a more detailed analysis of their provisions is necessary. See generally EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION, supra note 10, at §§ 19.6.5 through .6.9.

